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INTRODUCTION 
American constitutional practice embeds a principle that “the 
right to be let alone”1 be secured against pervasive government intru-
sion.  This principle of constitutional privacy invites further inquiry 
concerning what the right to be let alone entails, or when a prohibit-
ed intrusion occurs.  Different answers to these questions can pro-
 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.  I owe much 
gratitude for helpful discussion to Scott Aikin, Bob Barsky, Josh Eagle, Michael Hodges 
and the Law & Literature Discussion Group at Vanderbilt University. 
 1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The pro-
tection guaranteed by the Amendments . . . conferred, as against the Government, the 
right to be let alone . . . .”). 
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duce very different constitutional practices.  According to executive 
branch arguments, bulk collection of telephony metadata—a Nation-
al Security Agency (“NSA”) practice revealed in summer 2013—is 
consistent with these constitutional ideals.2  The Obama Administra-
tion justified NSA practices as consistent with constitutional princi-
ples, emphasizing both their Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” 
and the weight that should be afforded to the “strong public interest 
in the prevention of terrorist attacks.”3  By contrast, privacy scholars 
and advocates assert that the sheer magnitude of the program, com-
bined with its secretive implementation, invades the constitutionally 
protected privacy “right to be let alone” that Justice Louis Brandeis so 
pithily described.4  An additional analytic element erupts in this de-
bate:  comparisons to dystopian states.  Charges that the NSA surveil-
lance program constitutes an Orwellian police state contrast with 
counter-claims that national necessity requires ever greater and ever 
more sophisticated electronic surveillance.5  Alan Rusbridger, the edi-
tor of The Guardian, one of the leading newspapers to publish materi-
al about the NSA surveillance program leaked by Edward Snowden, 
claimed that “[t]he potential of the surveillance state goes way be-
yond anything in George Orwell’s 1984.”6  By contrast, Director of 
National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Jr. told a Senate committee 
that the leaks were “extremely damaging” to national security because 
“[t]hese disclosures are threatening our ability to collect intelligence 
and keep our country safe.”7 
 
 2 ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER:  BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 19 (2013). 
 3 Id. at 15, 21. 
 4 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also David Gray & Danielle Citron, 
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 73, 84, 112, 119, 122 (2013) (discuss-
ing the Fourth Amendment privacy concerns implicated by the surveillance state). 
 5 President Barack Obama described the situation regarding the necessity of more power-
ful surveillance tools as follows:  “It is hard to overstate the transformation America’s in-
telligence community had to go through after 9/11.  Our agencies suddenly needed to 
do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile powers and gathering in-
formation for policy makers.  Instead, they were now asked to identify and target plotters 
in some of the most remote parts of the world and to anticipate the actions of networks 
that, by their very nature, cannot be easily penetrated with spies or informants.”  Barack 
Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks on United States Signals Intelli-
gence and Electronic Surveillance Programs (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400030/pdf/DCPD-201400030.pdf. 
 6 Dominic Rusche, NSA Surveillance Goes Beyond Orwell’s Imagination—Alan Rusbridger, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/orwell-
nsa-surveillance-alan-rusbridger. 
 7 Ellen Nakashima, Officials Dodge Questions About Surveillance, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2013, 
at A3. 
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Orwellian analogies or “police state” comparisons are not mere 
rhetorical fashion.  During oral arguments in United States v. Jones, a 
case that featured sustained electronic monitoring of an individual’s 
movements, Orwell’s novel 1984 was mentioned six times, helping to 
frame argument and hypotheticals.8  The prevalence of references to 
the novel suggests that there is something distinctive about dystopian 
discourse in constitutional reasoning.  Why in a case asking whether 
the Fourth Amendment regulates government use of electronic mon-
itoring are Justices making reference to plot features of a mid-
twentieth century novel?  As this Article argues, dystopian constitu-
tionalism is a distinctive and important aspect of the American consti-
tutional tradition.  Dystopian analysis provides a method through 
which constitutional values are articulated and applied in contrast to 
values and practices the American polity agrees it wishes to avoid 
even when there remains disagreement over those to which it might 
aspire.  In addition, dystopian constitutionalism looks holistically at 
the effects of doctrinal rules, avoiding the pitfalls of doctrinal particu-
larism that attempts to craft rules blind to the wider social and politi-
cal contexts in which they apply.  Referring to Orwell in oral argu-
ments allowed the Court to explore the systemic effects of the rule 
they might adopt regarding unwarranted Global Positional System 
(“GPS”) monitoring.  The conflict between such systemic police sur-
veillance and the right to be let alone invites dystopian contrasts. 
Beyond these references in Jones, there is a rich tradition of using 
contrastive dystopian states in constitutional argument.9  As constitu-
tional tradition going back to the founding, constitutional analysis 
was replete with arguments about what practices would lead to an 
 
 8 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 23, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012) (No. 10-1259).  Justice Breyer, for example, comments: 
And no one, at least very rarely, sends human beings to follow people 24 hours a 
day.  That occasionally happens.  But with the machines, you can.  So if you win, 
you suddenly produce what sounds like 1984 from their brief.  I understand they 
have an interest in perhaps dramatizing that, but—but maybe overly.  But it still 
sounds like it.   
  Id. at 4–5. 
 9 Earlier scholarship to address the use of totalitarian thinking in both judicial opinions 
and in constitutional theory include Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Consti-
tutionalism:  The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 313 (2003) (noting the use of totalitarian thinking in the domi-
nant cross-constitutional influences); Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism:  Trans-
lating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1193, 1220–25 & 
nn.101–14 (1998) (examining the courts’ use of totalitarian comparisons); Richard Pri-
mus, A Brooding Omnipresence:  Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L. 
J. 423, 424–26 (1996) (exploring the influence of anti-totalitarianism on modern consti-
tutional scholarship and the Supreme Court). 
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undesirable state of tyranny.  To cite only one example, James Madi-
son argued in Federalist No. 47 that “the accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of 
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elec-
tive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”10  In 
more recent constitutional history, the use of contrasting examples of 
the “police state,” totalitarianism, or Orwellian references have been 
prevalent in Supreme Court opinions across doctrinal domains.  Ex-
tending from the post World War II-era through the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution, in majority opinions and in dissents, 
the threat of a “police state” or other forms of totalitarian or tyranni-
cal governments motivated the Court to articulate constitutional con-
straints on government actors, and often more particularly on polic-
ing practices.  During the period in which the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized criminal procedure, the Second World War was 
fresh in the minds of Americans, while the Cold War dominated for-
eign policy and inflected everyday life.11  Even as American politics 
decried the abuses of its competitor regimes and ideologies, the 
Court had before it evidence that policing practices regularly failed 
to satisfy constitutional standards.12  Justice John Paul Stevens ob-
served in a later case considering the scope of police authority to 
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles, that “[o]ver the years—
particularly in the period immediately after World War II and partic-
ularly in the opinions authored by Justice Robert Jackson after his 
service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials—the Court 
has recognized the importance of this restraint as a bulwark against 
police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes.”13  Interactions 
between citizens and police, when they become abusive or perceived 
 
 10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 11 See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 12 (2000) (noting that civil rights reform was in part a product of the Cold 
War); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2013) (“The Cold War 
featured new ways of war making in addition to conventional war.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944) (finding that incommunicado 
interrogation for thirty-six hours violated due process).  The Court also contrasted the 
fact that  
[t]here have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedi-
cated to an opposite policy:  governments which convict individuals with testimony 
obtained by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize per-
sons suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring 
from them confessions by physical or mental torture. 
  Id. at 155; see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (extended interrogations); Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (improper search); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 
285–86 (1936) (confessions obtained through torture). 
 13 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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as illegitimate, are ripe for dystopian contrasts.14  Legal resistance to 
the prospect of a “police state” established a clear contrast not only 
between the arbitrary authority associated with totalitarian regimes 
and the freedom protected by the Fourth Amendment in particular, 
but by other constitutional provisions as well.  Writing in dissent from 
the Supreme Court’s initial failure to apply Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule to the states, Justice William Douglas declared:  “The 
search and seizure conducted in this case smack[s] [sic] of the police 
state, not the free America the Bill of Rights envisaged.”15  In other 
similar Fourth Amendment cases, the Court imposed constitutional 
constraints on police practice, with an eye towards steps, as Justice 
Douglas again phrased the issue in concurrence, “that would take us 
closer to the ideological group we profess to despise.  Until the 
amending process ushers us into that kind of totalitarian regime, I 
would adhere to the protection of privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment . . . was designed to afford the individual.”16  This method of 
analysis employs dystopian contrasts to clarify and construct constitu-
tional meaning. 
Such comparisons continue to serve.  Even when defending the 
American public a program of pervasive surveillance under the NSA 
telephony metadata program, President Barack Obama recognized 
that “totalitarian states like East Germany offered a cautionary tale of 
what could happen when vast, unchecked surveillance turned citizens 
into informers and persecuted people for what they said in the priva-
cy of their own homes.”17  Referencing the findings of the Church 
 
 14 They are ripe for such contrasts because humankind has experience with the abuses of 
the police state.  See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951) (discuss-
ing the police state in China and Russia); HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 77 (1970) 
(warning that in pursuit of order, violence and riots may disappear from the streets and 
be transformed into “the invisible terror of a police state”).  For the personal and political 
implications of a police state, see also Letter from Václav Havel to Dr. Gustáv Husák, 
General Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party (Apr. 8, 1985), in LIVING IN TRUTH 3, 
6–8 (Jan Vladislav ed., 1986) (“Thus, the very fact that the state police are in a position to 
intervene at any time in a man’s life, without his having any chance of resisting, suffices to 
rob his life of some of its naturalness and authenticity and to turn it into a kind of endless 
dissimulation.”). 
 15 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134, 149 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Writing in 
dissent in the same case, Justice Frankfurter wrote, concerning the illegal police action in 
the case, “[a] crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and pun-
ish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism.”  Id.  (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
The majority opinion, written by Justice Jackson, did not dispute the common law and 
constitutional illegality of the police actions under review, but followed Wolf v. Colorado.  
See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to the states). 
 16 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 67–68 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 17 Obama, supra note 5, at 1. 
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Committee from the 1970s,18 President Obama also acknowledged 
that, “the United States proved not to be immune to the abuse of sur-
veillance.”19  In this way, the totalitarian state provides a method of 
comparison—a way to judge the legitimacy and legality of govern-
ment action.  The conclusions that follow from the comparison, how-
ever, are not mechanical.  In declaring that the surveillance program 
likely violates the Fourth Amendment, District Court Judge Richard 
Leon described the very program President Obama defends in his 
public speech as implementing “almost-Orwellian technology that 
enables the Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of 
every telephone user in the United States . . . .”20 Orwellian references 
therefore help structure a debate around a common negative exem-
plar, but do not determine the conclusions that will follow. 
No doubt, dramatic contrasts can be hyperbolic and rhetorical.  
Perhaps there is something excessive about calling forth George Or-
well’s 1984, or decrying tyranny, or invoking totalitarian government 
when police behave badly, or when presidents take actions in the 
name of national security that have questionable legality.21  Despite 
what might sometimes seem like overwrought rhetoric, I maintain 
that there is an important constitutional method to such analysis that 
warrants further inquiry.  Examining this method, and what is lost 
when it no longer forms part of constitutional analysis, sheds light on 
important problems of constitutional doctrine, with particular em-
phasis on free speech and Fourth Amendment doctrine.22 
What makes the method of dystopian constitutional analysis dis-
tinctive?  Dystopian constitutionalism analyzes American constitu-
tional principles in opposition to undesirable legal and political 
 
 18 The FBI engaged in a Counter Intelligence Program (“COINTELPRO”) beginning in the 
1950s, in which it conducted covert surveillance of anti-war and civil rights groups, among 
others, leading to an eventual Senate investigation led by Senator Church.  See S. REP. NO. 
94-755, bk. II, at 22 (1976) (recognizing three periods of growth for domestic intelli-
gence). 
 19 Obama, supra note 5, at 1. 
 20 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 21 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information:  How Not to Think About Privacy and the 
Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2014) (“[I]t became common, even ubiq-
uitous, to cite Orwell’s 1984 for what life would look like if attacks on privacy were not re-
sisted.”); Michael M. Moynihan, Sorry, It’s Not 1984, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 2013 (declaring 
that “[t]he idea that Orwell’s super weapon applies to Obama’s America is ubiquitous 
and bipartisan”). 
 22 For example, technological developments combined with new forms of social interaction 
challenge search and seizure doctrines developed for different contexts.  In addition, 
governing priorities—including preventative order-maintenance policing and national 
security surveillance—pressure existing doctrinal rules.  These problems have led to calls 
to reconsider the third-party doctrine. 
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states.  In contrast to liberal constitutional orders, these undesirable 
governing states commit systemic human rights abuses and violate 
rule of law ideals, forming totalitarian or tyrannical regimes.  When 
employed in processes of constitutional decision-making, dystopian 
analysis constructs consequence avoidance arguments taking the fol-
lowing form:  If American constitutional practice is to avoid either 
these bad practices or becoming like these bad governments, then we 
should adopt contrary constitutional principles.  Dystopian constitu-
tionalism is not confined to criminal procedure.  Dystopian refer-
ences can even be oblique, as for example when Justice Felix Frank-
furter warned: 
The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free socie-
ty. . . .  The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to 
a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the po-
lice, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as 
inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the histo-
ry and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.23 
Dystopian constitutionalism requires courts to consider the sys-
temic negative consequences of constructing a rule one way rather 
than another.  This task is logically more minimalist than utopian 
constitutionalism would be.  A Court need not aim for a particular 
utopian social and political ideal.  It need only avoid undesirable 
constitutional consequences.24  Particular practices, if given a consti-
tutional imprimatur, would remove the distinction between American 
constitutionalism and a police state, as Justice Frankfurter, joined by 
Justice Jackson, wrote in dissent in a Fourth Amendment case:  “Ar-
rest under a warrant for a minor or a trumped-up charge has been 
familiar practice in the past, is a commonplace in the police state of 
today, and too well-known in this country.”25  In seeking to avoid un-
desirable consequences, the Court should consider structural or sys-
temic effects of the rules it adopts.26  And, in so doing, decision mak-
ers also need to provide some articulation of the underlying values, 
such as privacy or dignity, at stake.  In this way, dystopian analysis is 
 
 23 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
 24 In this sense, dystopian analysis promotes minimalist judicial decisions.  See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48 (2005) (discussing the role of ju-
dicial minimalism in decisions relating to the scope of the Constitution’s protection of 
liberty). 
 25 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
 26 But, in this alternative sense, dystopian analysis promotes more maximalist judicial deci-
sions.  Sunstein, supra note 24, at 2. 
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not all negative.  Dystopian analysis can be “jurisgenerative” in the 
sense that it helps legal analysts to create and articulate legal values in 
opposition to those they seek to avoid.27 
Despite its power to organize constitutional principles in compari-
son to undesirable states, dystopian constitutionalism has waned 
somewhat in the periods following the mid-century.  By contrast, over 
this same period, interest in constitutional theory has flourished.  
Debates among minimalism,28 originalism,29 living constitutionalism,30 
and even a hybrid living originalism31 have gained much attention as 
methods for interpreting the constitution.  Lumping these together, 
Judge Harvie Wilkinson claims they are all versions of what he calls 
“cosmic constitutionalism.”32   Judge Wilkinson argues against the 
need to adopt a grand theory of constitutional law, preferring more 
deference to legislative processes.33  What differentiates dystopian 
constitutionalism from all of these “grand theories” is that it does not 
purport to provide a comprehensive way of understanding the consti-
tution.  Rather, in the spirit of what Judith Shklar calls the “liberalism 
of fear,” it provides a way of organizing our collective thought in rela-
 
 27 See Robert M. Cover, Forword:  Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) (“[T]he 
creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place always through an essentially cul-
tural medium.”); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 1–2 (1993) 
(explaining that law “is not determined by external authorities . . . [r]ather, law arises 
from the arbitrary nature of its own positivity”). 
 28 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 3 (1999) (noting the tendency for judges to narrowly tailor their decisions and 
“say[] as little as necessary in order to justify an outcome”). 
 29 See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 1 (2013) (describing the prevalence of originalism among legal scholars 
and judges and justifying the continued reliance on the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion). 
 30 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742–43 (2007) 
(positing that the living Constitution is the result of modern Americans’ nation-centered, 
rather than state-centered, political identity and noting that it is the judicial revolution 
and passage of landmark statutes, not formal amendments, that lead to fundamental 
transformations in constitutional law); see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION 1–3 (2010) (arguing that originalism is flawed and positing that a living 
Constitution is best able to reflect current societal values). 
 31 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–4 (2011) (arguing that originalism and the 
living Constitution are not, in fact, incompatible theories and positing that we must be 
faithful to the original text and principles of the Constitution, while maintaining the flex-
ibility to apply it to the modern-day values of the American people). 
 32 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 3–4 (2012). 
 33 In this way, like minimalist approaches, Wilkinson has close affinities with James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 144 (1893) (detailing the deference courts must give to legislatures, overturning on-
ly those acts that “have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so 
clear that it is not open to rational question”). 
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tion to states of government we wish to avoid.34  It helps us under-
stand how to better implement constitutional principles into worka-
ble rules, not by holding up an ideal, but by urging us away from the 
negative alternative.  In this respect, dystopian constitutionalism has a 
rich tradition going back to the founding era when institutional de-
sign was focused less on obtaining an ideal state of governance than 
on achieving a workable system of self governance that would avoid 
descent into tyranny. 
Dystopian constitutionalism is also subject to transformations in 
our understandings of the states we fear.  Constitutional moments are 
always possible whereby politics and interpretive meanings change to 
reflect new understandings and practices.  Shifts in constitutional 
grammar can reflect, as well as create, transformations in the consti-
tutional meanings of government practices.35  Constitutional gram-
mar includes the terms and concepts of legal analysis as well as the 
normative visions of how legal rules fit into a more comprehensive 
constitutional order.  Thus, as a non-comprehensive analytic method, 
dystopian constitutionalism is subject to wax and wane as salient ex-
amples of undesirable states emerge, and as the polity shifts its un-
derstandings of unacceptable exercises of government power.  When 
it came to NSA bulk metadata collection, for example, the Obama 
Administration relied on the particularistic reasoning in the Court’s 
opinion in Smith v. Maryland, which applied a doctrine of third-party 
exposure to police access to telephone numbers dialed, to argue that 
the program violates no privacy rights.36  Yet, the President in justify-
ing pervasive surveillance referred to how “the basic values of most 
Americans” depend “on the law to constrain those in power,” suggest-
ing that American constitutionalism in practice requires not only ju-
dicial doctrine, but also a broader comparative constitutional dis-
 
 34 Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. 
Rosenblum ed., 1989). 
 35 Very different constitutional visions can give rise to very different constitutional practices, 
the consequences of which can matter far more than the changes wrought through pro-
cesses of formal constitutional amendment.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Cul-
ture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5, 8 (2003) (describing as “remarkable” the 
“unexpectedly liberal” turn of the Supreme Court’s 2002 Term and “explor[ing] the var-
ious ways in which constitutional law is and is not independent from the beliefs and val-
ues of non-judicial actors”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 
YALE L.J. 408, 441 (2007) (describing the Court’s interpretation of certain Article II war-
time powers as “creatures of the extracanonical constitution” for Congress to “constitute” 
to the President “by devising the institutional structures and procedures through which it 
may be exercised”). 
 36 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
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course about, as President Obama puts it, “how we remain true to 
who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speed.”37  Past 
and future are mediated through constitutional analysis that is some-
times doctrinally particular—applying a third-party doctrine designed 
in an era of rotary telephones to digital communications—and at 
other times normatively holistic—comparing commitment to “our” 
values to alternative possibilities.  It is the latter that makes salient the 
systemic effects of the former.  In deciding whether to trade off liber-
ties and security, dystopian constitutionalism asks decision makers to 
consider the structural consequences of the tradeoffs they make in 
the hope that if ideal outcomes are unachievable, that distinctively 
negative ones can be avoided. 
In Part I, I will describe and explain the elements of dystopian 
constitutionalism.  These include the use of consequence avoidance 
arguments often taking the form of slippery slopes.  They also in-
clude the use of negative exemplars and legal archetypes—the latter 
first developed by Jeremy Waldron as a way of organizing our under-
standing of more holistic bodies of law.38  Having described the 
method, Part II examines dystopian constitutionalism’s multiple uses 
throughout the past six decades in Supreme Court opinions and dis-
sents.  In democracy and individual freedom cases as well as in crimi-
nal procedure cases, the Supreme Court has used dystopian analytic 
contrasts to widen the scope of constitutional reasoning from more 
particularistic doctrinal considerations to more holistic structural 
questions. In Part III, I explore how consequence avoidance argu-
ments can be turned on their head by a different ordering of priori-
ties.  Practices once thought undesirable can lose their taint, a shift 
reflected in the relationship between the logical argument forms of 
modus tollens and modus ponens.  But, as this Part demonstrates, there 
are a number of positive effects in using a dystopian analysis, one of 
the chief virtues of which is to encourage more holistic analysis of le-
gal rules.  Moreover, holistic consideration of constitutional values in 
service of consequence avoidance arguments do not render dystopian 
constitutionalism into a version of irrational “tyrranaphobia.”39  Final-
 
 37 Obama, supra note 5, at 5, 9. 
 38 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:  Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1681, 1722–23 (2005). 
 39 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 3–5 (2010) (characterizing liberal legalism’s fear of executive 
power, particularly in the modern administrative state, as “tyrannophobia, or unjustified 
fear of dictatorship,” in that it fails to consider the checks that politics and public opinion 
place on the executive). 
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ly, this Part ends by situating dystopian constitutionalism in relation 
to dominant theories of constitutional interpretation. 
I.  WHAT IS DYSTOPIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
In 1516, Sir Thomas More published his fictional account of an is-
land in the new world that had a high level of social and political or-
ganization.40  This non-place, Utopia, provided a contrast to Europe-
an states, with all their conflicts over political organization.  Through 
presentation of the comparative ideal state of Utopia, More opened 
up the possibility of critical reflection on the real state of affairs his 
fellow Europeans occupied.  This method of analysis owes much to 
Plato’s Republic, which also described an ideal organization of the 
state to demonstrate why one should be just even if one could get 
away with injustice.41  Seeing a political state in ideal form fosters in-
sight into the non-ideal setting of actual practices.  More’s Utopia is 
less an organized philosophical analysis than a literary presentation of 
a purported travel narrative that makes possible critical reflection 
about possible social and political order.  In publishing his Utopia, 
More initiated a form of narrative critical analysis, and gave the name 
to a genre of writing, since followed in many other works of fiction.42 
But, ideals are not always so ideal.  Indeed, even in More’s Utopia, 
there is considerable ambiguity about the actual desirability of living 
in such a political order.  When the ideal mirrors a darker reflection, 
utopia becomes dystopia.  And just as there is a rich utopian literary 
tradition,43 a related dystopian tradition exists as well.44 
Dystopian constitutional analysis uses the negative exemplar of a 
state to be avoided as a way of understanding the scope and meaning 
of constitutional principles.  Dystopian analysis can proceed from a 
 
 40 THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA, at vii–xiv (Mildred Campbell ed., D. Van Nostrand Co. 1947) 
(1516). 
 41 PLATO, PLATO’S REPUBLIC 161–72 (I.A. Richards ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1966) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 42 From the early modern period works such as FRANCIS BACON, NEW ATLANTIS (Alfred B. 
Gough ed., Clarendon Press 1924) (1627), James Harrington, The Commonwealth of 
Oceana, in THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS (J.G.A. Pocock 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1656), and Margaret Cavendish, The Description of a 
New World, Called The Blazing-World (Kate Lilley ed., 1994) (1666) followed this tradition, 
and examples of more modern texts include H.G. WELLS, A MODERN UTOPIA (Gregory 
Claeys ed., Penguin Books 2005) (1905) and ALDOUS HUXLEY, ISLAND (2009) (1962). 
 43 See, e.g., BACON, supra note 42. 
 44 The dystopian tradition has flourished primarily over the past century.  A few representa-
tive works include MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985); ALDOUS HUXLEY, 
BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); and GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).  
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particular case to examine the consequences that would follow if it 
were systemically adopted.  Dystopian analysis can also call attention 
to the constitutive elements of the undesired state as a way of arguing 
against adopting those elements in the present case.  As should be-
come evident, an interesting feature of dystopian analysis is that it is 
often easier to measure a present practice against an undesirable 
state than it is to conform political and institutional practice to an 
ideal state to be achieved. 
Utopias require perfectionist reasoning aimed at creating a com-
pletely ordered political society free from conflict.  More’s Utopia is 
comprised of fifty-four cities ordered alike and peopled by the same 
number of individuals all dressed similarly who conduct their affairs 
in complete conformity to prevailing norms.  Political harmony pro-
duces a uniform order that in turn eliminates social and political 
dissensus.  In this way, Utopia describes a state where politics becomes 
unnecessary and law is indistinguishable from social norms.  A critical 
purpose of constructing a utopian state is the ability to measure the 
distance between the present state of affairs and the perfected ideal.  
Once the picture of the ideal state is suitably painted, it can be used 
as a mirror to reflect back upon our present practices and their defi-
ciencies.  Utopian thought, as the political philosopher Rainer Forst 
suggests, “aims to pull out the roots of social evil”45 by showing what a 
world would look like without particular injustices.  The difficulty, 
however, is with the suitability of any such painting, for if consensus 
on the ideal already existed, the path to its attainment would be less 
fraught.46  In this way, a utopia can be illustrative.  But a utopia can 
also become a project of political perfectionism to pursue. 
Utopias can serve more than a critical purpose.  They can become 
the aspirational guides to positive political action.  But aspiring to 
fashion a utopian society free from the usual constraints of politics 
can be a problematic pursuit, often entailing a conception of perfec-
tionism used to justify any means necessary to its pursuit.  As Isaiah 
Berlin argues, the problem with utopian thinking put into action is 
that when people seek to achieve a utopia, not merely use it for criti-
 
 45 RAINER FORST, JUSTIFICATION AND CRITIQUE 177 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2014). 
 46 As the political philosopher Rainer Forst notes, there is an ambiguity about utopia be-
yond its use as a source of critique:  “Utopia is a complex mirror that shows that we must 
leave our world behind but at the same time that it is very difficult to reach another—
difficult not only because of the long and arduous passage to utopia but also because of 
the constant doubts whether it is worth it.”  FORST, supra note 45, at 181. 
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cal analysis, violence and suffering are likely to ensue.47  Reconstruc-
tion of social and political order in pursuit of some desired organiza-
tional end state requires disruption and compulsion.48  No doubt, dis-
ruption is in part what defines a political project as revolutionary.49  
Eighteenth-century Americans sought to compel a new political order 
in pursuit of ideals of equality and political participation, that per-
haps were far from utopian in their conception, but nonetheless were 
based on ideals that a “more perfect union” was possible.50  But utopi-
an politics involve the pursuit of more perfectly fixed notions of polit-
ical and social order that is more than revolutionary.  Regarding such 
pursuits, Isaiah Berlin concludes his analysis of utopian ideas in west-
ern thinking with the following:  “Immanuel Kant . . . once observed 
that ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ev-
er made.’  And for that reason no perfect solution is, not merely in 
practice, but in principle, possible in human affairs, and any deter-
mined attempt to produce it is likely to lead to suffering, disillusion-
ment and failure.”51  The pursuit of utopia can itself lead to a form of 
dystopia. 
Unlike utopia, dystopias are not states of political desire.  They are 
states of aversion.  Dystopias function as warnings that help shape ex-
isting practices away from undesirable end states.  Wholesale political 
or legal reorganization is not required.  Instead, critical reflection on 
negative consequences enables an existing constitutional order to 
avoid taking steps that might lead to situations the polity seeks to 
avoid.  Thus, as an initial matter, dystopian analysis can be conserva-
 
 47 ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY:  CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
47 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).  Berlin described the problem like this: 
[T]here persists an age-old dream:  there is, there must be—and it can be found—
the final solution to all human ills; it can be achieved; by revolution or peaceful 
means it will surely come; and then all, or the vast majority, of men will be virtuous 
and happy, wise and good and free; if such a position can be attained, and once at-
tained will last for ever, what sane man could wish to return to the miseries of 
men’s wanderings in the desert?  If this is possible, then surely no price is too 
heavy to pay for it; no amount of oppression, cruelty, repression, coercion will be 
too high, if this, and this alone, is the price for ultimate salvation of all men?  This 
conviction gives a wise license to inflict suffering on other men, provided it is done 
for pure, disinterested motives. 
  Id. 
 48 This sentiment is shared by Sir Karl Popper, who wrote:  “I consider what I call Utopian-
ism an attractive an, indeed, an all too attractive theory; for I also consider it dangerous 
and pernicious.  It is, I believe, self-defeating, and it leads to violence.”  Karl R. Popper, 
Utopia and Violence, in CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:  THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 477, 482 (1963). 
 49 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). 
 50 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 51 BERLIN, supra note 47, at 48. 
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tive.  It need not require any action other than preservation of the 
status quo.  Any legal or political change aims to maintain its distance 
from the undesirable state, wary of pursuing a more perfect political 
idea.  In this way, dystopian thought begins with a shared aversive 
agreement.  We might disagree over what the good life would be like 
or how to “promote the general welfare,”52 but we might more easily 
agree on what would constitute an undesirable state of affairs.  Ex-
amples from life and literature provide content to these agreements.  
Nazi Germany, Soviet communism, Oceana,53 and London After 
Ford54 all signify dystopian possibilities to be avoided on which wide-
spread agreement might exist.  These dystopian states form a shared 
vocabulary on which constitutional analysis can draw.55 
A.  Elements of Dystopian Analysis 
Three primary elements are involved in dystopian analysis.  First, 
begin with a rough factual agreement about a known or imagined al-
ternative state the governance of which involves repression, violence, 
tyranny, or disrespect for human rights and liberties.  These can be 
actual or fictional.  Such agreement can also extend to particular 
practices thought constitutive of the undesirable state.  For example, 
as the Supreme Court has argued, arbitrary arrest is a practice consti-
tutive of a police state.56  The details can remain unspecified, for the 
point is to compare elements constitutive of an undesirable state ra-
ther than to provide a complete analysis of the comparative state. 
The second element is a consequence avoidance argument.  The 
basic argument form works as follows.  If we do not want to become 
like the dystopian state, then we must avoid adopting policies or legal 
rules that are either constitutive of the dystopian state or would likely 
set us on a path that would lead to such a state.  Such consequence 
 
 52 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 53 See generally ORWELL, supra note 44. 
 54 See generally HUXLEY, supra note 44.  
 55 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Forward:  Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (“No 
set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and 
give it meaning.”). 
 56 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 433 (1976) (noting the balance between 
“society’s valid interest in the earliest detention of suspected criminals that is consistent 
with the individual’s interest in freedom from arbitrary interference with his liberty”); 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Arrest 
under a warrant for a minor or a trumped-up charge has been familiar practice in the 
past, is a commonplace in the police state of today, and too well-known in this country.”); 
see also infra note 134 and accompanying text (citing judicial references to the importance 
of the Fourth Amendment in protecting a free society and avoiding a police state). 
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avoidance arguments have the logical form of a modus tolens argu-
ment.  If a legal rule or political practice is consequentially related to 
the dystopian state, then to avoid the consequence, we deny the legal 
rule or practice.  Take, for example, the legal status of torture.  Begin 
with the proposition that if particular interrogation methods are 
thought consistent with constitutional principles, then the polity will 
share a practice with undesirable states known to torture.  Posit wide-
spread agreement on the claim that a polity understands the practice 
of torture to be a constitutive practice of a dystopian state it wishes to 
avoid.  It follows that if the polity does not want to be like those na-
tions that torture, then it should not adopt constitutional rules that 
allow the methods of interrogation they use.  Such consequence 
avoidance arguments construct a common narrative about a constitu-
tive normative identity.  Who we are as a polity is in part a function of 
what we value.  And what we value is manifest through what we do—
or what we refuse to do. 
Examination of the constitutive values at stake when seeking to 
avoid a negative outcome comprises the third element.  Dystopian 
analysis makes clear that examination of values is necessary in order 
to determine what principles and practices a polity should adopt.  It 
is difficult to measure how best to avoid undesirable outcomes with-
out some articulation of why those outcomes are undesirable.  A con-
stitutive element of the negative model is not merely the precise prac-
tices, but how those practices reflect and further values alien to those 
to which we are committed.  If we sought to do no more than adopt a 
particular practice or institution because that is the opposite of what 
is done in a comparative undesirable state, we would lack the ability 
to analyze, and thus anticipate, how other practices might lead to sim-
ilar undesirable consequences.  In this way, constitutional avoidance 
leads to questions about national identity; and questions about con-
stitutional meaning are, in turn, inseparable from national identity.  
Thus, consideration of key values and principles is necessary when 
deciding whether a rule of law or institutional practice coheres with a 
polity’s traditions or leads to a dystopian possibility. 
By engaging in dystopian analysis, we are better able to articulate 
national identity and constitutional values.  Professor Kim Scheppele 
makes a similar analytic distinction between what she calls aversive 
and aspirational constitutionalism.57  She argues that the process of 
 
 57 Scheppele, supra note 9, at 299–300.  Throughout this project, I have been greatly influ-
enced by Scheppele’s formulation of aspirational ad aversive comparative constitutional-
ism. 
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borrowing when engaging in constitution building or in legal deci-
sion making can be both aspirational and aversive.  Sometimes com-
parative legal analysis aspires to achieve some principle or practice 
found desirable in another system.  In this way, a court, for example, 
might cite foreign law for aspirational guidance about how best to 
understand a domestic legal principle.  Or constitutional designers 
might explicitly adopt another constitution’s institutional framework 
by “borrowing” desirable features.  When forming a constitution, a 
polity need not reinvent the wheel, but can begin by borrowing de-
sign elements from other constitutions that might best work within its 
unique circumstances.58 
But sometimes comparative legal analysis cites to other sources of 
law that a polity seeks to avoid.  In this way, aversive constitutionalism 
“is backward-looking, proceeding from a critique of where past (or 
other) institutions and principles went badly wrong and taking such 
critiques as the negative building blocks of a new constitutional or-
der.”59  The logic of aversive constitutional analysis, using the example 
of coerced confessions, reasons that “[i]f America is to do the oppo-
site of what these bad governments do, then the Court should hold 
that this confession was coerced.”60  In this way, aversive analysis fo-
cuses on the practices attributable to the negative model, and reasons 
to a contrary position.  Aversive arguments look to actual examples of 
undesirable states.  During the Cold War, for example, the Court 
looked to the Soviet Union and recent European totalitarian regimes 
as concrete examples of states to avoid.  The better formed the ex-
ample of the aversive state and the greater the agreement on its un-
desirability, the more effective the constitutional argument.  So un-
derstood, aversive constitutionalism is one way of engaging in what I 
am identifying as dystopian analysis.61 
 
 58 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 
(2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an interpretive practice characterized by a 
deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive ends”). 
 59 Scheppele, supra note 9, at 300.  Moreover, “Aversive constitutionalism . . . calls attention to 
the negative models that are prominent in constitution builders’ minds.”  Id.  Negative 
comparisons are also part of the literary tradition from which constitutional analysis bor-
rows.  As Daniel Defoe observes in Robinson Crusoe, “[t]hus we never see the true State of 
our Condition till it is illustrated to us by its Contraries, nor know how to value what we 
enjoy, but by the want of it.”  DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 147 (Angus Ross ed., 
Penguin Books 1965) (1719). 
 60 Id. at 315. 
 61 Scheppele is also focused on the identity constitutive aspects of constitutional analysis.  
“Aversive constitutionalism identifies a deeper sense of knowing who you are by knowing 
what you are not; it incorporates a nation-making sense of rejection of a particular constitutional 
possibility.”  Id. at 300. 
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Dystopian analysis does more than reject alternative models.  It al-
so requires the legal decision maker to examine possible political 
practices and legal rules for what their systemic tendencies might be.  
It is proleptic as well as reactive.  The negative model serves an im-
portant purpose not merely in encouraging us to adopt contrary posi-
tions, but to think more holistically and systemically about how a rule 
or practice might produce similar consequences or lead to otherwise 
undesirable outcomes.  Thus, more than doing the opposite of the 
negative model, dystopian analysis asks how a decision might lead to 
consequences of similar effect to those found in, or consistent with, 
the negative model.  How might rules that are neither the same nor 
the opposite of something found in the negative model nonetheless 
produce consequences to be avoided?  Moreover, under dystopian 
analysis the negative model need not be precisely formed.  It can be a 
general idea of totalitarianism or of the general notion of a “police 
state.”  Just as utopias can be more or less precise guides to greater 
political perfection, dystopias can be more or less well-formed exem-
plars of states of affairs a polity wishes to avoid.  A principal reason 
for wishing to avoid the dystopia is the inconsistency with deeply held 
values thought constitutive of the polity’s identity. 
Because dystopian analysis requires an examination of values, it 
has a positive—utopian—aspect as well.  To understand why the al-
ternative state is undesirable a legal decision maker must provide a 
positive articulation of the values to be preserved.  In this way, dysto-
pian constitutionalism does not entirely escape the problems of artic-
ulating and pursuing an ideal conception of politics and society.  
Though in seeking to avoid negative consequences, the role that the 
positive articulation plays is far less a project of holistic transformative 
political projects as it is a project of affirming existing or desired val-
ues.  Yet these acts of affirmation are themselves acts of creation, for 
they solidify and further develop values in pursuit of a “more perfect” 
governing state, as the United States Constitution’s Preamble pro-
jects.62 
B.  Sliding Towards Dystopia:  The Slippery Slope 
Beginning with a shared conception of some undesirable state, 
dystopian analysis can also take the form of slippery slope argu-
 
 62 U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also FORST, supra note 45, at 179 (“[U]topian thinking:  it is neither 
bound to existing reality nor to the ideal; instead it is in between—that is the real meaning 
of ‘nowhere.’”). 
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ments.63  These arguments do not conclude that the rule, practice, or 
institution under consideration will produce an immediate dystopian 
state.  Rather, these arguments reason that adopting a particular legal 
rule, for example, will lead down a slope towards dystopia.  This slope 
becomes more slippery when the legal rule becomes embedded in 
widespread practice.  To avoid sliding down the slope to political ru-
in, we should adopt a consequence avoidance argument—where the 
consequence to be avoided is a future consequence that would follow 
if the slope were sufficiently slippery.64 
In logical form, this reasoning is expressed in the conditional 
statement:  If we adopt the proposed legal rule, then we produce an 
intolerable risk of creating a police state.65  The risk will not be real-
ized by merely adopting the proposed rule itself.  Rather, having tak-
en the initial step, then through a series of additional steps leading 
down the slope, we may find ourselves at the bottom.  To avoid the 
slide, we should avoid the first step.  The risk captured by the slippery 
slope argument can take several forms.  First, it could be that the 
proposed rule change opens up good analogies for other rule chang-
es based on the same rationale, which if adopted collectively would 
lead to the undesirable state.  A rationale affirmed for one case, can 
apply to additional cases.  Through a series of analogies, cases that 
bear a family resemblance to the initial precedent, when taken as a 
whole, can produce a legal system that has the undesirable character-
istics.  Thus, to avoid adopting reasoning that would have widespread 
application and risk wholesale practical and institutional conse-
quences, the argument urges against opening up the chain of analo-
gies. 
Second, it could be a problem that exists in the implementation 
of the legal rule licensing either a particular practice or an exception 
to a particular practice.  The limited use of the rule or the exception 
in itself might be acceptable, but it opens the risk to widespread use, 
which would change the nature of the practice.  An exception adopt-
ed in one case could with repetition become the norm, altering the 
 
 63 See generally DOUGLAS WALTON ET AL., ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 339–41 (2008); 
DOUGLAS WALTON, SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS (1992). 
 64 See Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1469–70 
(1999) (analyzing the role that slippery slope arguments play in legal reasoning in cur-
rent debates); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1985) (exam-
ining the prevalence of slippery slope arguments in the realm of free speech); Eugene 
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1028 (2003) (describ-
ing the role of slippery slopes in policymaking and lawmaking). 
 65 See WALTON, SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS, supra note 63, at 217 (discussing the modus po-
nens logical form of the slippery slope argument). 
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nature of the rule.66  Because a decision maker cannot control the 
frequency of future uses, and because frequency can matter to the 
nature of the legal practice, the slippery slope argument recommends 
against adopting the limited use rule or exception.  Moreover, even if 
we were tempted to adopt a rule that has the potential for both posi-
tive and negative consequences depending upon the circumstances, 
its use by other institutions might remain largely unchecked and 
therefore open to the undesirable uses.  A decision maker within one 
institution cannot foresee or control how the rule might be adopted, 
or used as justificatory precedent, in other institutional settings. 
Third, it could be that the proposed legal rule or institutional 
practice would be constitutive of the kinds of rules and practices 
found in the dystopia.  For example, arbitrary arrest is a practice that 
itself is thought to be constitutive of a police state.  A legal regime 
that authorizes arbitrary arrest is also likely to license similar practices 
constitutive of the undesirable state.  Thus, if we adopt constitutive 
features of the police state in one situation, what would prevent the 
growth of similar practices, setting us on the path to becoming like 
the negative example? 
If the emotional state that accompanies utopia is desire, the emo-
tional state that motivates dystopia is fear.67  A fourth way the link be-
tween a present case and the future slippery slope is related is 
through our emotional attachments and aversions.  Fear can alter 
how we assess risks, and if the consequences are sufficiently dire, we 
might reassess the legal rules and practices we adopt.68  The more 
catastrophic the consequences of reaching the bottom of the slope, 
the more skeptical we might become of taking the first step—or re-
fusing to take the steps necessary to avoid the slide.  Fear can moti-
vate both the slippery slope version of dystopian analysis as well as the 
simple consequence avoidance version.  For example, reassessment of 
national security risks happened in the wake of the attacks of Sep-
tember 11.69  Vice President Dick Cheney, for instance, reasoned that 
 
 66 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); see also infra notes 156–157, 159, 166 
(establishing an exception to the constitutional prohibition of warrantless search and sei-
zure). 
 67 See, e.g., Shklar, supra note 34, at 23. 
 68 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
(2005). 
 69 See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE:  DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS 
ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 150 (2006) (explaining Vice President Cheney’s “one percent doc-
trine” which holds that if there is even a one percent chance of another terrorist attack, 
given the gravity of the possible harm, that risk must be addressed as if it were a certain-
ty). 
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lest we risk catastrophic consequences, we must forego legal con-
straints on executive action.70  Even when there is a very low probabil-
ity of catastrophe, fearing the dire consequences of sliding down the 
slope can inform decisions about legal rules and practices.  By con-
trast to the way that utopias can provide more unified regulative ide-
als, the potential pathways into a dystopian state are more numerous 
and uncharted.  Risk aversion provides a powerful motivation to avoid 
these possible pathways. 
Emotional attitudes like fear or desire express attitudes about an 
initial case, the bottom of the slope, and the relation between the 
two.  In this fifth way, dystopian analysis expresses conservative atti-
tudes and implicit judgments about the present and possible states of 
affairs that relate to a proposed change in legal rule or institutional 
practice.  Slippery slope arguments seek to preserve the status quo 
against change that might take the first step down the slope.  When 
change in the direction of the slope is thought desirable, slippery 
slope arguments motivate decision makers to build in greater checks 
to the initial decision to prevent further slide.  As always, the degree 
to which one worries about the slope depends on one’s attitude 
about the bottom of the slope.  The more catastrophic the bottom, 
the more vigilant one will be about the top. 
Slippery slope arguments reflect a fear the proposed legal rule 
would undermine constitutional values thought necessary to avoid 
key features of the undesirable state.71  So, it is not merely that the 
proposed rule creates a precedent for future analogical reasoning, 
but that the proposed rule alters a key principle or value constitutive 
of the polity’s present identity.  To change the principle would be to 
change a core constitutional meaning, which in turn would give new 
shape to national identity in a way that makes the undesirable state 
possible. 
C.  Negative Exemplars and Legal Archetypes 
When it comes to expressing deeply held constitutional commit-
ments, not all laws have equivalent legal or moral status.  Some laws 
structure our understanding of broader areas of legal and political 
practice.  Habeas corpus, for example, is no doubt an important pro-
 
 70 Id.; see also Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power:  The Legal Mind Behind the White House’s War on 
Terror, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/07/03/
the-hidden-power.  
 71 See Lode, supra note 64, at 1540–41 (“Often, allowing [a proposed legal rule] would 
threaten values that are important to a significant segment of our population.”). 
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vision enabling the jailed to contest the jailor’s power.  But it is more 
than that.  It expresses the fundamental importance of protecting in-
dividual liberties against arbitrary exercises of executive power by 
guaranteeing institutional checks against overzealous political ac-
tion.72  Habeas corpus stands as the “bulwark of our liberties” accord-
ing  to William Blackstone, occupying a status within the legal system 
that exceeds its procedural function.73 
Because of its unique status within our legal system, Jeremy Wal-
dron argues that it is a legal archetype.74  To understand what he 
means by a legal archetype, we must first recognize that positive law 
acquires meaning through how we see and implement the relations 
among disparate legal provisions over time.  Individual laws work in 
relation to other laws to embody principles and norms that express 
more comprehensive, as well as background, shared moral and legal 
meanings.  In this way, any particular law derives its practical mean-
ing in part from a background of settled principles and practices.  
For example, a law prohibiting political protest targeted at a specific 
residential address can be understood only against the background 
principles of privacy and free expression, combined with the 
acknowledged special role the home plays in everyday life.75  When 
the Supreme Court upholds such a law, it must appeal to background 
principles of law with which any particular law must cohere.  Some-
times there is a particular law that occupies a position within the legal 
system that stands for the principle and spirit of a whole area of law.  
Habeas corpus is an example.  Waldron suggests that a particular law 
becomes an archetype when it “by virtue of its force, clarity, and viv-
idness expresses the spirit that animates the whole area of law.  It be-
 
 72 See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 107 (2011) (“[F]rom a fairly early point 
the Magna Carta provision of no arbitrary imprisonment was associated with the idea that 
arbitrary treatment was to be understood in terms of not following the ‘law of the 
land.’”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2034 (2007) (following a legal pro-
cess perspective to illuminate the “distinctive competencies” of the legislature, executive, 
and judiciary in handling issues arising in habeas cases). 
 73 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136–37. 
 74 Waldron, supra note 38, at 1718–39. 
 75 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding a city ordinance banning resi-
dential protests).  For the significance of privacy in the home, see, for example Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (finding the area immediately surrounding a resi-
dence to be part of the home itself and therefore constitutionally protected from investi-
gation by police dogs); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment draws a “firm” and “bright” line “at the entrance to the house”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) 
(“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into 
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
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comes a sort of emblem, token, or icon of the whole . . . .”76 He fur-
ther explains: 
The idea of an archetype, then, is the idea of a rule or positive law provi-
sion that operates not just on its own account, and does not just stand 
simply in a cumulative relation to other provisions, but operates also in a 
way that expresses or epitomizes the spirit of a whole structured area of 
doctrine, and does so vividly, effectively, and publicly, establishing the 
significance of that area for the entire legal enterprise.77 
The positive significance of an archetype for Waldron is that it can 
guide our understanding of “the point, purpose, principle, or policy 
of a whole area of law.”78 
Archetypes are important for their ability to organize legal mean-
ing.  Brown v. Board of Education, for example, sums up our under-
standing that an era of widespread discrimination is no longer to be 
given legal sanction, and social practices that humiliate individuals 
are no longer to be tolerated.79  In a closely contested case, we can 
appeal to the principle for which a particular law, or a particular 
precedent, stands as the paradigm.  Brown’s status extends beyond the 
school desegregation question.  In this sense, an archetype can assert 
what Ronald Dworkin has described as a “gravitational force”80—
pulling later decisions within the orbit of its normative meaning.81  
Overturning or displacing an archetype with an alternative rule or 
practice also has a more pervasive effect within a legal system and 
therefore faces a more substantial hurdle to passage or implementa-
tion. 
Archetypes are not always positive examples of our best ideals.  
Sometimes, what defines and motivates a body of law is a state of af-
 
 76 Waldron, supra note 38, at 1722. 
 77 Id. at 1723. 
 78 Id. 
 79 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Brown v. Board of Education serves as a good example of a legal ar-
chetype establishing a principle against entrenched humiliation in American constitu-
tional law.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 133 
(2014) (challenging “constitutionalists to make the principle of equality meaningful to 
ordinary Americans . . . . [I]f segrated schools didn’t humiliate, what did?”).  See generally 
Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:  
THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
 80 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977) (postulating that the full 
force of a decision is not known until later cases are decided). 
 81 In a similar fashion, some legal precedents have a different status than others.  We can 
describe some as “superprecedents.”  See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1204, 1207 (2006) (“Super precedent marks the point at which the institutional val-
ues of stability, consistency, institutional and social reliance, and predictability in consti-
tutional law become compelling, enduring, and fixed.  Super precedent reflects, in short, 
what may be sacred in American constitutional law.”). 
Dec. 2015] DYSTOPIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 615 
 
fairs it seeks to avoid.  At its most basic organizational level, the rule 
of law is contrasted with chaos or arbitrariness.82  These are each con-
ditions under which the order law imposes on social and political 
practices is absent.  Lacking such order, social and political practices 
cease to have the regularity necessary to settle and organize human 
affairs.  As more specific bodies of law develop, particular states of af-
fairs can serve as negative exemplars against which the law is arrayed. 
Take, for example, criminal prosecutions conducted through far-
cical trials adhering to the outlines of procedure without any of the 
substance.  Such was the case in 1923 when Arkansas prosecuted 
black citizens for their response to the “Elaine Race Riot,” promising 
that in lieu of a lynch mob, the white citizens should “let the law take 
its course”—by which was meant that the law would undoubtedly find 
the black defendants guilty and impose capital sentences.83  A trial 
“dominated by a mob,” the Supreme Court concluded, violates due 
process of law.  Similarly, when the State of Mississippi adhered to the 
bare form of a trial, extracting confessions by torture admitted in 
open court, the Supreme Court concluded that “what is denominat-
ed, in complimentary terms, the trial of these defendants,” violated 
constitutional standards of due process.84  As the Court admonished, 
“[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the wit-
ness stand.”85  Or, finally, consider the prospect of forcibly pumping a 
suspect’s stomach to retrieve possible evidence.  The Court conclud-
ed that such conduct constitutes “methods too close to the rack and 
the screw to permit” police the power to use such means to extract 
confessions.86  Claims against such abusive and brutal practices are 
claims about the fundamental lack of due process of law.  The sub-
stantive violation stands as a negative exemplar of conduct forbidden 
to state officials under a system of law and ordered liberty. 
The fact that these due process cases do not establish doctrinal 
rules of criminal procedure derives from the nature of the definite 
 
 82 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84, 177 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1904) (1651) (contrasting the state of nature where “the life of man[] [is] solitary, 
poor[], nasty, brutish, and short” with the peace and security provided by a common-
wealth). 
 83 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90 (1923).  As local officials put the point:  “they would 
execute those found guilty in the form of law.”  Id. at 89.  Or again, local officials prom-
ised that “if the guilty parties were not lynched, and let the law take its course, that justice 
would be done and the majesty of the law upheld.”  Id. at 90.  See also Michael J. Klarman, 
The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 50–52 (2000). 
 84 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936). 
 85 Id. at 285–86. 
 86 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
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description used.  In these cases, the Court does not provide a rule 
that supplies necessary and sufficient conditions for the proscribed 
practices.  Rather, the Court uses a definite description to refer to 
prohibited state of affairs.87  The referring expression takes the form:  
Whatever else due process of law requires in criminal process, this 
practice—farcical trials or forced confessions, for example—fails on 
any account.  Both the logic and the spirit of these decisions use neg-
ative exemplars to define an area of prohibited government action.  
Practices similar to those identified by definite description are off 
limits.  For the strict doctrinalist, or the jurist focused on providing 
defined rules for police conduct, such an approach is far too impre-
cise.  But negative exemplars are meant to provide meaning to areas 
of life by establishing parameters that guide by example, not by rule.  
In this way, farcical trials and confession by torture become negative 
exemplars of criminal process. 
Negative exemplars are also used to articulate constitutional and 
political values.  Dappling presidential speeches, or those of other 
executive officials, American identity is often constructed according 
to shared values.  These common values constitutive of our identity 
are often articulated in contrast to negative exemplars.  More opaque 
in content, President Obama defended the need for widespread NSA 
surveillance practices by acknowledging: 
[I]t is not enough for leaders to say, “Trust us, we won’t abuse the data 
we collect.”  For history has too many examples when that trust has been 
breached.  Our system of government is built on the premise that our 
liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those in power, it de-
pends on the law to constrain those in power.88 
The oblique reference to history must contemplate the history of 
abuse of domestic surveillance the Church Committee compiled and 
that led to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 
1978.89 
 
 87 Definite descriptions have an important role in the philosophy of language.  See, e.g., Ber-
trand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479, 479 (1905) (“The subject of denoting is of very 
great importance . . . in theory of knowledge.”); see also Keith S. Donnellan, Reference and 
Definite Descriptions, 75 PHIL. REV. 281, 281 (1966) (critiquing Russell’s failure to “deal 
with the duality of function” of definitive descriptions as “obscur[ing] the genuine refer-
ring use of definitive descriptions”). 
 88 Obama, supra note 5, at 5. 
 89 The FBI engaged in a Counter Intelligence Program (“COINTELPRO”) beginning in the 
1950s, monitoring the activities of anti-war and civil rights groups.  Discovery of this pro-
gram led to an eventual Senate investigation by Senator Church.  See S. REP. 94-755, at 1–
2 (1976) (“The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial, even massive wrongdoing 
within the ‘national intelligence system.’”). 
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These negative exemplars exist in the identity claims we often 
make by reference to constitutive political identity—to who we are 
not and what we do not do.  “We” do not torture.  We do not act arbi-
trarily.  We do not deny individuals their basic human rights.  Regard-
ing farcical trials or torture, courts construct rules to limit governing 
power.  But in making rules effective in theory or practice, courts 
employ the negative exemplar to articulate what kinds of practices or 
what states of affairs exist beyond the limit.  These same limits are 
those that President Obama recognizes when he claims that law 
needs to constrain those in power. 
Dystopian constitutionalism is a way of constructing arguments 
and identity.  A polity can define their constitutive identity both by 
the ideals they pursue and through the consequences they seek to 
avoid.  As the next section will illustrate, in Supreme Court practice, 
dystopian analysis focuses on the various ways Americans employ par-
ticularly robust negative models to help define the constitutional 
principles and political practices we wish to constitute our identity.  
Dystopian analysis relies on consequence avoidance arguments that 
make use of slippery slopes and negative exemplars to help define 
and refine constitutional meaning.  In so doing, dystopian constitu-
tionalism focuses on more than narrowly constructed doctrinal issues 
by bringing into view systemic and holistic constitutional concerns. 
Holistic considerations exemplified by Waldron’s conception of 
negative exemplars matter because the effects of a particular consti-
tutional rule can vary, depending on its importance within constitu-
tional and political practice—considerations invisible to particularis-
tic approaches.  Constitutional principles examined within a more 
holistic setting have the additional virtue of requiring decision mak-
ers to consider questions of value that might elude the jurist focused 
on narrow, particularistic questions of doctrine.  In this way, there is a 
positive aspect to dystopian analysis in asking what are the values at 
stake and how do they function in social and political life.  When a 
particular constitutional principle takes on a role as a negative exem-
plar, it stands for more than a narrow consideration related to a par-
ticular doctrinal rule.  Rather, it shapes constitutional meanings and 
values that provide broader conceptions of appropriate government 
practice.  In this away, the negative exemplar can be a positive ena-
bler of sound governing practice.  Dystopian constitutionalism is also 
positive constitutionalism.90 
 
 90 On the distinction between negative and positive constitutionalism, see, for example 
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS & CONSTRAINT:  ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 6–8 
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II.  DYSTOPIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PRACTICE 
Having described the elements of dystopian constitutional analy-
sis, it will be instructive to examine dystopian analysis at work in Su-
preme Court cases to provide a basis for seeing why these arguments 
are an important feature of American constitutionalism.  In practice, 
constitutional criminal procedure and free speech cases involve re-
view of state practices that implicate entrenched values vulnerable to 
state violations that left unchecked could produce a slide towards un-
desirable governing states.  When deploying consequence avoidance 
arguments, courts have the task of affirming the values they seek to 
preserve as well as those they wish to avoid.  When it comes to consti-
tutional criminal procedure, dystopian analysis is often employed to 
protect core values such as privacy and liberty.  In free speech cases, 
dystopian analysis affirms the values of collective self-governance and 
liberty of thought.  Criminal procedure and free speech cases both 
implicate the relation between the power of the state as exercised by 
its police and the ability of individuals to live free from unjustified in-
terference—the right to be let alone as identified by Justice Brandeis.  
To see dystopian analysis at work is to begin to see why it is indispen-
sable to American constitutionalism. 
A.  Democracy and Individual Freedom 
Free speech doctrine has been forged through wartime struggles 
and emergency circumstances, perhaps more so than in peacetime 
and normal political life.91  Often, when the pressure mounts to sup-
press speech most, the need for First Amendment protection is great-
est.  Yet, the Supreme Court’s record in forging free speech protec-
tions during wartime has not been stellar, succumbing to executive 
claims of necessity in the heat of the moment, only to adjust doctrine 
later.92  And when times are difficult during war or crisis, the urge to 
suppress or compel speech invites comparisons to negative conse-
quences.  Responding to the City of Chicago’s imposition of a 
 
(1995) (describing negative constitutionalism as a theory that views a constitution as a 
check on tyranny and abuses of power and positive constitutionalism as an idea that a 
constitution can reinforce royal sovereignty). 
 91 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004). 
 92 See id. at 530–50.  Compare, for example the distance the Court travelled from its early 
First Amendment cases such as Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Debs v. Unit-
ed States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), with the standard that emerged in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969).  See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION (1988). 
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“breach of peace” ordinance to a provocative speaker, Justice Douglas 
explained, 
[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that govern-
ment remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is 
effected.  The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and 
programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from 
totalitarian regimes.93 
Even during ordinary times, there exists a temptation by governing 
officials to censor the content of speech—to regulate what is appro-
priate and what is disallowed.  Considering the constitutionality of 
the congressional Stolen Valor Act passed in 2005, which made it a 
crime to falsely claim to have received a military award, the Court 
switched the comparison to a fictional dystopia, though the compara-
tive analysis remained the same: 
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal of-
fense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible 
whisper, would endorse government authority to compile a list of sub-
jects about which false statements are punishable.  That governmental 
power has no clear limiting principle.  Our constitutional tradition stands 
against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.94 
Allowing government officials to regulate permissible and impermis-
sible statements would be a practice without a clear distinction from 
the dystopian state George Orwell imagined.95  In this way, dystopian 
constitutionalism is not restricted by comparison to actual compara-
tive tyranny, but can be based on a general dystopian totalitarianism 
as well as a fictionalized dystopian state.  Supreme Court Justices have 
made ample use of Orwell.96 
 
 93 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, (1949).  Justice Douglas repeats this claim in a ma-
jority opinion in a later case involving an individual sentenced to prison for circulating a 
pamphlet concerning a labor dispute.  See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966). 
 94 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 
(1949) (Centennial ed. 2003)). 
 95 See generally ORWELL, supra note 44. 
 96 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573, 611 (1989) (“Although Justice Kennedy accuses the Court of ‘an Orwellian re-
writing of history,’ perhaps it is Justice Kennedy himself who has slipped into a form of 
Orwellian newspeak when he equates the constitutional command of secular government 
with a prescribed orthodoxy.”); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 335 
(2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge 
that the ad is banned under § 203 only if it ‘is targeted to the relevant electorate . . . .’ 
This Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional under any 
known First Amendment theory, that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so 
long as his intended audience could not hear him.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995–96 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]o portray Roe as the 
statesmanlike ‘settlement’ of a divisive issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is 
worth preserving, is nothing less than Orwellian.”); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 
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No matter the source of the comparison, the attempt to compel 
order by regulating what speech is appropriate belongs to the ways of 
thinking that totalitarian regimes adopt.  But to compel speech, no 
different than to censor it, can also lead to dystopian contrast.  In nei-
ther case, Justice Jackson reasoned, has the government power “in 
our constitutional constellation . . . [to] prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, 
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”97  In 
holding that a compulsory flag salute violated the First Amendment, 
Justice Jackson observed that “[s]truggles to coerce uniformity of sen-
timent in support of some end thought essential to their time and 
country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men.”98  He 
continued by arguing that the “[u]ltimate futility of such attempts to 
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort . . . down to the 
fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.  Those who 
begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves extermi-
nating dissenters.”99  Given the fact that the Court had upheld a simi-
lar compulsory flag salute a mere three years earlier,100 West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette was decided explicitly because of 
the contrast with the governing state to be avoided.  It is a paradigm 
of dystopian constitutionalism.  It posits a comparative state to be 
avoided, reasons that particular practices are constitutive of the un-
desirable state, and employs slippery slope arguments to dire conse-
quences American constitutionalism should seek to avoid. 
These examples of dystopian analysis examine the implications of 
the challenged government action (censorship and compulsion) for 
their consistency with principles and institutions of deliberative self-
 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment demands that we temper our 
efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern for the impact on our fundamental liber-
ties of the methods we use.  I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the 
police surveillance methods they would sanction were among those described 40 years 
ago in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s:  ‘The black-mustachio’d face 
gazed down from every commanding corner.  There was one on the house front immedi-
ately opposite.  Big Brother Is Watching You, the caption said. . . . In the far distance a 
helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and 
darted away again with a curving flight.  It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s 
windows.’  Who can read this passage without a shudder, and without the instinctive reac-
tion that it depicts life in some country other than ours?” (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 
4 (1949))). 
 97 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 98 Id. at 640. 
 99 Id. at 641. 
100 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595–600 (1940) (upholding require-
ment that students recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite religious objection). 
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government.  If we are to avoid becoming like our enemies—those 
who censor dissenters and eliminate dissent—then we have to under-
stand constitutional principles as protecting individuals from gov-
ernment action that compares to what totalitarian governments do.  
When there is a question about how best to interpret a constitutional 
principle, dystopian analysis asks us to consider how best to distin-
guish the principle from totalitarian practice.  Beyond a general con-
cern for freedom of speech and thought as well as democratic pro-
cess, the breadth of constitutional issues capable of such distinction 
include structural issues of the President’s power to seize private 
property in the name of national security,101 or the power of the Court 
to consider habeas petitions,102 or even the power of a state to crimi-
nalize distribution of contraceptives.103 
This process of distinction does not always produce principles that 
give priority to civil liberties over national security.  During the Cold 
War, the Supreme Court confronted First Amendment challenges to 
prosecutions under the Smith Act of persons accused of conspiring to 
advocate overthrow of the government.  National security loomed as 
a pressing governing necessity.  In Dennis v. United States, the Court 
 
101 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“[T]he description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to 
doubt that [the Founding Fathers] were creating the new Executive in [George III’s] im-
age. . . . [I]f we seek instruction from our own times, we can match it only from the exec-
utive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe as totalitarian.  I cannot ac-
cept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power . . . .”). 
102 Writing for a majority the year after his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Frankfurter rea-
soned concerning the writ of habeas corpus that “[i]ts history and function in our legal 
system and the unavailability of the writ in totalitarian societies are naturally enough re-
garded as one of the decisively differentiating factors between our democracy and totali-
tarian governments.”  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953). 
103 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“While it 
may shock some of my Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects 
the right of material privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the person-
al liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totali-
tarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional con-
cepts.”).  When the issue of Connecticut’s contraception law first came before the Court, 
Justice Douglas had dissented from the Court’s claim that the petitioners lacked standing, 
reasoning that: 
One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of society is that it seeks to 
make all subcommunities—family, school, business, press, church—completely 
subject to control by the State.” . . . Can there be any doubt that a Bill of Rights 
that in time of peace bars soldiers from being quartered in a home, ‘without the 
consent of the Owner’ should also bar the police from investigating the intimacies 
of the marriage relation?  The idea of allowing the State that leeway is congenial 
only to a totalitarian regime. 
  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert L. 
Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. LAW FORUM, 31, 36 (1960) and U.S. CONST. 
amend. III). 
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reasoned that mere conspiracy to advocate the desirability of over-
throwing the government “creates the danger” of bringing about that 
end, and noted the dangers created by “the inflammable nature of 
world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-
and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners 
were in the very least ideologically attuned . . . .”104  The analysis here 
is attuned to the prospect of negative political consequences from the 
claimed threat.  Thus, although the dystopian analysis is more implic-
it, the logic begins with an undesirable consequential state (the over-
throw of the government in favor of a communist totalitarian system) 
and then reasons to what understanding of constitutional principle 
might best avoid such consequences.  In this case, the best under-
standing of principle, according to the Court, is that the prosecutions 
for mere speech were consistent with First Amendment constraints. 105  
Speech produces the threat of totalitarianism, not its censorship. 
As the Supreme Court turned away from upholding convictions 
for violation of the Smith Act based on membership in communist 
organizations, it employed language exhorting the contrast between 
our system of democratic governance and that of totalitarian systems 
as prohibiting further suppression of speech and association in the 
name of national security.106  During this period of reassessment, Jus-
tice Hugo Black was particularly apt to turn to dystopian contrasts.107  
Along with Justice Douglas, these appeals to dystopian consequences 
were often in dissent.  But, the Court’s views were in flux, eventually 
becoming far more skeptical of government claims that prosecution 
 
104 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510–11 (1951). 
105 Id. at 509 (regarding the First Amendment “clear and present danger” test, the Court rea-
soned that “the words cannot mean that beforethe Government may act, it must wait until 
the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal awaited”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
106 See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18–19 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (“A law 
which applies to membership without ‘specific intent’ to further the illegal aims of the 
organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms.”); see also United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national 
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties—the freedom of asso-
ciation—which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 609–10 (1967) (upholding First Amendment rights to academic 
freedom). 
107 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 77–78, (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“In my judgment this case must take its place in the ever-lengthening line of cases in 
which individual liberty to think, speak, write, associate[,] and petition is being abridged 
in a manner precisely contrary to the explicit commands of the First Amendment. . . . I 
believe that the loyalty and patriotism of the American people toward our own free way of 
life are too deeply rooted to be shaken by mere talk or argument from people who are 
wedded to totalitarian forms of government.” (footnote omitted)). 
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for speech or association was necessary to preserve national security.  
For example, in overturning a conviction of individuals prosecuted 
under the Smith Act based on mere membership in a communist or-
ganization, Justice Black explained: 
The conviction of the petitioner here is being reversed because the Gov-
ernment has failed to produce evidence the Court believes sufficient to 
prove that the Communist Party presently advocates the overthrow of the 
Government by force.  The Government is being told, in effect, that if it 
wishes to get convictions under the Smith Act, it must maintain a perma-
nent staff of informants who are prepared to give up-to-date information 
with respect to the present policies of the Communist Party. . . .  I do not 
disagree with the wisdom of the Court’s decision . . . [b]ut I think that it 
is also important to realize . . . such a system of laws gives to the perpetua-
tion and encouragement of the practice of informing - a practice which, I 
think it is fair to say, has not always been considered the sort of system to 
which a wise government would entrust the security of a Nation.  I have 
always thought, as I still do think, that this Government was built upon a 
foundation strong enough to assure its endurance without resort to prac-
tices which most of us think of as being associated only with totalitarian 
governments.108 
A possible consequence of the claim that the government had not 
shown sufficient evidence that mere speech apart from organized 
leadership roles was a sufficient threat would be for the government 
to redouble its effort at surveillance and to prove the threat.  Justice 
Black argued that not only is suppression of speech a constitutional 
problem, but so too is the government’s method of making its case.  
Both the suppression and the monitoring are indistinguishable from 
totalitarian practices that seek to dominate the social and political 
lives of citizens.  Constitutional foundations that include protection 
for politically disfavored speech are very different from those on 
which totalitarian governments are built. 
Justice Black also employed such reasoning against the loyalty 
oaths that many states required.  He argued, 
It seems self-evident that all speech criticizing government rulers and 
challenging current beliefs may be dangerous to the status quo.  With full 
knowledge of this danger the Framers rested our First Amendment on 
the premise that the slightest suppression of thought, speech, press, or 
public assembly is still more dangerous. . . . Tyrannical totalitarian gov-
ernments cannot safely allow their people to speak with complete free-
dom.  I believe with the Framers that our free Government can.109 
 
108 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 301–02 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). 
109 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).  In time, the Su-
preme Court articulated constitutional grounds for eliminating loyalty oaths in American 
life.  See, e.g., Robel, 389 U.S. at 264 (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national 
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties—the freedom of asso-
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Are loyalty oaths required of government employees distinguishable 
from totalitarian practices?  The answer, according to Justice Black’s 
concurrence is a clear negative, because such oaths change the order 
of priority between citizen and government.  Citizens who are em-
powered to speak with complete freedom are capable of self-
governing.  By contrast, those constrained by mandatory oaths are 
deprived of the critical tools necessary for democratic governance. 
Using the same method of distinction in another free speech case 
involving the arrest of a street corner speaker, however, Justice Black 
argued that: 
[t]he end result of the affirmance here is to approve a simple and readily 
available technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject 
all speeches, political or otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the super-
vision and censorship of the local police.  I will have no part or parcel in 
this holding which I view as a long step toward totalitarian authority.110 
In Feiner v. New York, police had exercised discretion to maintain 
street order to silence the speaker rather than restrain the restless 
members of the audience, manifesting the connection between con-
cern over policing practices and the robust functioning of democratic 
society.111  Justice Black was not focused on the specific speaker and 
speech act at issue, but on the systemic effects of a principle of free 
speech law that would license silence of the speaker at the discretion 
of the police officer.  Constitutional principles that license state and 
local action, whether loyalty oaths or discretionary police action that 
censors speech, can produce dystopian systemic effects.  The question 
in such cases is not whether a dystopia would result in Oklahoma or 
in New York if such practices were allowed.  Rather, the question is 
whether the constitutional principle is consistent with dystopian 
states if put into systemic effect.  In these and related cases, the Su-
preme Court’s task was to define the values that constitute a free and 
deliberative polity by contrast to real and possible states of govern-
ance inconsistent with these values. 
B.  Criminal Procedure 
The concern Justice Black articulated in his Feiner dissent was that 
giving power to police at their discretion to censor speech on side-
 
ciation—which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile”); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 609–
10 (upholding First Amendment rights in academic freedom); Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 18–
19 (finding a statute must be drawn narrowly enough so as not to infringe upon protect-
ed rights without a compelling state interest). 
110 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 323 (1951). 
111 Id. at 316–18. 
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walks, which the Court at times has held up as the paradigm place of 
free speech activity,112 is indistinguishable from totalitarian practices.  
The freedom to speak and the freedom from compulsion to speak 
are related values protected under the First and Fifth Amendments.  
When considering the systemic effects of criminal procedure rules, 
democratic concerns are unavoidably preeminent.  For example, a 
citizen’s encounter with an officer of the law has implications for a 
person’s standing and expressed membership in the polity.  The kind 
of state in which one lives, and the kinds of citizens that state fosters, 
depend in part on the rules of criminal procedure.113  And the kind of 
state one might rationally seek to avoid makes dystopian analysis sali-
ent in both doctrinal domains. 
In addition, by attempting to compel conformity through manda-
tory flag salutes, or loyalty oaths, or suppression of speech deemed 
dangerous to the state, the state can enforce its conception of order 
through its policing practices.  Bringing constitutional constraints to 
bear on police practices from the mid to the late twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court confronted examples of police abuses that raised 
fundamental constitutional questions and invited dramatic con-
trasts.114  These examples covered both police searches and interroga-
tions.  Regarding searches, for example, Irvine v. California featured 
police officers arranging for a locksmith to provide them with a key 
to a suspect’s home, using the key to enter and place microphones in 
a hallway, closet and bedroom, and boring a hole in the roof of the 
house to run wires to transmit the information to a nearby location—
all without the benefit of a judicial warrant, leading Justice Douglas to 
proclaim that such actions “smack of the police state.”115  Because of 
their possible systemic political effects, the methods employed by the 
police are susceptible to dystopian constitutional analysis.  Regarding 
interrogations, for example, writing for a majority in Chambers v. Flor-
ida, Justice Black reasoned that confessions wrought from interroga-
 
112 See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding that public 
fora “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions”); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 
(1939) (finding that an ordinance prohibiting distribution of leaflets on public property 
violates the First Amendment). 
113 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment against search and seizure by the 
police, except under the closest judicial safeguards, is not an outworn bit of Eighteenth 
Century romantic rationalism but an indispensable need for a democratic society.”).  
114 See Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism, supra note 9, at 1260. 
115 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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tions conducted over a week invite comparisons with “[t]yrannical 
governments [which] had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal 
procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of 
helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who dif-
fered, who would not conform and who resisted tyranny.”116  Similarly, 
considering whether a confession wrought from thirty-six hours of 
continuous interrogation violated constitutional standards, Justice 
Black reasoned: 
The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the convic-
tion of any individual in an American court by means of a coerced con-
fession.  There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with gov-
ernments dedicated to an opposite policy:  governments which convict 
individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations possessed of 
an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of crimes against the 
state, hold them in secret custody, and wring from them confessions by 
physical or mental torture.  So long as the Constitution remains the basic 
law of our Republic, America will not have that kind of government.117 
Here again, the dystopian method posits a comparative state to be 
avoided.  If American policing practice is to avoid being like “certain 
foreign nations and governments”118 that practice torture and other 
abuses, then the Constitution must be read to prohibit such practices.  
Constitutional principle, not simply political choice, bars such prac-
tices.  Justice Black’s reasoning is not only about how policing prac-
tices might function, but also about a “kind” of government, a form 
understood in contrast to other political forms to be avoided. 
Holistic constitutional principles governing searches, like confes-
sions wrought from abusive police practice, are basic elements of a 
due process approach to criminal procedure and invite use of dysto-
pian analysis.  In this way, under both Fifth Amendment and due 
process standards, the Court used dystopian contrasts to guide the 
principles that have now become embedded in constitutional doc-
trines related to interrogations.119 
A similar story exists for the development of Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure law.  For example, in applying Fourth Amendment 
search standards to the states via the Due Process Clause, Justice 
Frankfurter reasoned that 
[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free socie-
ty. . . . The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to 
 
116 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940). 
117 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944) (citations omitted). 
118 Id. 
119 See Raymond, supra note 114, at 1203–05. 
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a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the po-
lice, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as 
inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the histo-
ry and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.120 
Obliquely referring to “recent history” to paint a particular, yet gen-
eralizable, image of the dystopian possibility to be avoided, Justice 
Frankfurter does more than make a doctrinal argument for why the 
Fourth Amendment should be understood to forbid the search in 
question; rather, he takes a more holistic approach to explain why 
searches of the kind in question are inconsistent with the founda-
tional form and function of American constitutionalism.121  In this 
way, holistic considerations, when it comes to questions of widespread 
surveillance, conflict with more particularistic approaches that focus 
primarily on providing bright line rules to aid everyday policing prac-
tices.  Without judicial vigilance in subordinating police action to 
constitutional scrutiny, Justice Frankfurter warned in United States v. 
Rabinowitz that “the progress is too easy from police action 
unscrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state.”122  Doctri-
nal scrutiny looks not only to the episodic and sequential nature of a 
police action, but also the systemic effects of its repetition. 
With Justice Jackson’s opinion in Johnson v. United States, 
the Supreme Court crafted Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
doctrines with the aim of establishing a bulwark against the possibility 
of what it identified as a “police state”: 
An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his of-
fice and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis 
in law for the intrusion.  Any other rule would undermine “the right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,” and 
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our 
form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-
state where they are the law.123 
In this opinion, Justice Jackson draws a key distinction between a re-
gime in which police officers have unfettered discretion and one in 
which they are confined within rule of law constraints.124  Who de-
 
120 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
121 Id. 
122 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
123 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (citations omitted). 
124 Id.  The philosopher Bertrand Russell, describing the consequences of “State-Socialism,” 
as “an increase of the powers of [a]bsolutism and [p]olice [r]ule,” warned that “acquies-
cence in such a state . . . [was] acquiescence in the suppression of all free speech and all 
free thought,” and was tantamount to “acquiescence in intellectual stagnation and moral 
servility.”  BERTRAND RUSSELL, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 114–15 (1896). 
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cides matters.125  Regarding judgments about probable cause, Justice 
Jackson observed that the “point of the Fourth Amend-
ment . . . consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the of-
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.”126  Otherwise, the Court reasoned, allowing police officers to 
search on their own determinations of probable cause would “leave 
the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”127  
When the state governs through the arbitrary and discretionary prac-
tice of police, then, as the Court admonished, it risks transforming its 
police powers into the workings of a “police state.”128  It is one thing 
for the state to have broad powers to make laws in pursuit of the gen-
eral welfare of the people, but it is a very different matter for the state 
to enforce its laws through the discretionary function of an institution 
left unchecked by constitutional constraints.  In this way, the “police 
state” organizes a dystopian conception of political practice, and in-
forms, by contrast, a positive view of American constitutionalism that 
prioritizes rule of and by law rather than rule by police.129 
Emerging technologies enabling more widespread and cost-
effective surveillance strain the balance between rule and discretion, 
and challenge the Court’s alternating focus on particularistic and ho-
listic constitutional analysis.  In concurring that a New York statute 
was unconstitutionally broad in granting police discretion to engage 
in surreptitious eavesdropping by placing a recording device in a pri-
vate office, Justice Douglas explained: 
I do not see how any electronic surveillance that collects evidence or pro-
vides leads to evidence is or can be constitutional under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.  We could amend the Constitution and so provide–a 
step that would take us closer to the ideological group we profess to des-
pise.  Until the amending process ushers us into that kind of totalitarian 
regime, I would adhere to the protection of privacy which the Fourth 
 
125 See generally Thomas P. Crocker, Who Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1511 (2012). 
126 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
127 Id. at 14. 
128 As Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson, explained in his dissent in another 
Fourth Amendment case, “[t]he founders wrote into the Constitution their conviction 
that law enforcement does not require the easy but dangerous way of letting the police 
determine when search is called for without prior authorization by a magistrate.”  United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
129 Justice Jackson also used the term “police state” to refer to totalitarian political regimes in 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War, observing in a 1950 case that, “[t]he international 
police state has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion, coup d’etat, terrorism 
and assassination.  Not only has it overpowered its critics and opponents; it has usually 
liquidated them.”  Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 429 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Amendment, fashioned in Congress and submitted to the people, was de-
signed to afford the individual.130 
In the end, however, Justice Douglas’s overall stance against pervasive 
electronic surveillance did not prevail. 
In a set of opinions that authorized surreptitious eavesdropping, 
the Court fashioned a doctrine premised on the claim that individu-
als have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information and 
items they share with third parties.  Under the Court’s reasoning, 
whether it is phone numbers dialed,131 banking transactions complet-
ed,132 public roadways travelled,133 or conversations shared,134 when we 
share with others, we lose Fourth Amendment privacy protections.  
Rather than confronting what the systemic effects of pervasive surveil-
lance might be, the Court looked narrowly at each episode of social 
sharing, and concluded that because a person cannot control a third 
party’s use of what is shared, no privacy protections could attach 
against discretionary police action to obtain that information.  As a 
result, Justice Douglas warned that “[o]nce electronic surveil-
lance . . . is added to the techniques of snooping which this sophisti-
cated age has developed, we face the stark reality that the walls of pri-
vacy have broken down and all the tools of the police state are 
handed over to our bureaucracy on a constitutional platter.”135  This 
constitutional platter is crafted from a particularistic approach to the 
Fourth Amendment that does not contemplate questions about 
whether widespread policing practices would be indicative of a dysto-
pian totalitarian state. 
 
130 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 67–68 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
131 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that no expectation of priva-
cy exists in phone numbers dialed). 
132 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in re-
vealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”). 
133 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automo-
bile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another.”). 
134 See United States. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (holding no expectation of privacy 
exists in private conversation overheard by police). 
135 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 349 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  During the 
period in which the Warren Court shaped constitutional criminal procedure, Justice 
Douglas was often in dissent.  In Terry v. Ohio, which established the authority for police 
officers to stop and frisk persons on the basis of reasonable suspicion, Justice Douglas 
employed a similar dystopian critique:   
 To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the 
totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of 
lawlessness.  But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people 
through a constitutional amendment.   
  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Following the pattern of other dystopian references, many invoca-
tions of the “police state,” as a state of excessive police discretion, oc-
cur in dissents that look to the wider effects of criminal procedure 
decisions.136  Dissents keep the analytic method salient even when not 
ascendant.  When the Court eliminated the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against searches for mere evidence—as contrasted with 
an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband—Justice Douglas wrote in 
dissent that 
I would adhere to [precedents] and leave with the individual the choice 
of opening his private effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the 
police or keeping their contents a secret and their integrity inviolate.  
The existence of that choice is the very essence of the right of privacy.  
Without it the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth are ready instruments 
for the police state that the Framers sought to avoid.137 
Regarding the Court’s holding in United States v. White, that persons 
assume the risk that their private communications will be electroni-
cally monitored through use of a confidential informant, Justice 
Douglas warned of “the need for judicial supervision under the 
Fourth Amendment of the use of electronic surveillance which, un-
controlled, promises to lead us into a police state.”138  He further 
warned that “[e]lectronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of hu-
man privacy ever known.”139  Similarly, Justice Douglas, writing in dis-
sent, observed that a practice of executing search warrants at 
nighttime is “more characteristic of a ‘police state’ lacking in the re-
spect for due process and the right of privacy dictated by the U.S. 
 
136 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171 (1947).  Utilizing the term “police state” for the 
first time in a judicial opinion, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, stated that Fourth 
Amendment “protection extends to offenders as well as to the law abiding, because of its 
important bearing in maintaining a free society and avoiding the dangers of a police 
state.”  Id.  The comparison has persisted despite subsequent changes to the composition 
of the Court.  See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 550 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[i]ndefinite involuntary incommunicado deten-
tions ‘for investigation’ are the hallmark of a police state, not a free society”). 
137 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Since Hayden, the 
Court has not attended to questions involving the object of searches, an omission with 
repercussions for surveillance.  See Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What?  The Im-
portance of Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata Sur-
veillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 729–34, (2014) (examining the Court’s failure to 
address the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and an “object of the search” 
inquiry, and discussing the effect on probable cause issues in surveillance and records 
searches). 
138 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
139 Id. at 756. 
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Constitution and history.”140  On the issue of electronically enhanced 
third-party informants, Justice Douglas’s view has not won the day.141 
But, the idea that there might be limits to pervasive electronic sur-
veillance—even under a claimed third-party justification—has con-
tinued constitutional salience, as the oral arguments in United States v. 
Jones illustrate through their repeated reference to Orwell’s 1984.142  
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones echoes Justice Doug-
las’s dissents, cautioning against extended GPS monitoring of a vehi-
cle’s movement: 
I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, 
in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so ame-
nable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to 
curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent “a too permeating 
police surveillance.”143 
Even though the dystopian element of Justice Sotomayor’s warn-
ing is oblique, the reader knows, from past Supreme Court majority 
opinions and dissents, that a “too permeating police surveillance”144 is 
a way of describing practices endemic to dystopian police state, which 
is “a greater danger to a free people”145 than constrained police prac-
tice, as Justice Jackson argued for the majority in 1948 in United States 
v. Di Re.  Indeed, Justice Jackson also wrote his opinion in Johnson v. 
United States, providing the paradigm statement of the dangers of the 
 
140 Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 460 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
141 See Cioffi v. United States, 419 U.S. 917, 918 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“‘[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions.’  In the absence of such judicial supervision, 
there is no effective safeguard against the possibility of an uncontrolled electronic police 
state.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).   
   Justice Douglas’s dissents decrying the “police state” have not been entirely ineffec-
tive.  For example, when a New York statute forbade membership in organizations that 
the state determined were “subversive,” Justice Douglas claimed in dissent that “[w]hat 
happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.  Teachers are under 
constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for signs of disloyalty; their utterances are 
watched for clues to dangerous thoughts.”  Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas’s view won out, as the Supreme Court 
reversed course and began to find laws proscribing membership in organizations uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment.  The Court’s decision in Keyishian effectively 
overruled Adler fifteen years later.  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608–09 
(1967). 
142 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, 13, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, (No. 10-
1259). 
143 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
144 United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948). 
145 Id. 
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police state, in the same year.146  These concerns—that unconstrained 
police surveillance alters the nature of a political state—whether ex-
pressed in majorities or dissents retain their salience in criminal pro-
cedure analysis focused more holistically on the consequences of 
constitutional rule implemented by policing practice.  Unconstrained 
police discretion “does not provide for government by clearly defined 
laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opinions 
of a policeman on his beat.”147  Indeed, merging the concerns of crim-
inal procedure and free speech, the Court warned that “[i]nstinct 
with its ever-present potential for arbitrarily suppressing First 
Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the hallmark of a police 
state.”148 
One of the problems in evaluating the prospects for wholesale 
government surveillance of communications is the uncertainty about 
the scope and scale of future practices under a doctrinal rule.  What 
might appear ex ante as a dystopian prospect could turn out ex post 
to be less frightening and more normal.  With dystopian analysis, 
there is the ever-present objection that it constitutes overwrought 
rhetoric, the reality being something less objectionable.  For exam-
ple, Professor Jack Balkin foretells the inevitability of a new “National 
Surveillance State,” that is a voracious consumer and analyzer of in-
formation about populations with the capacity to never forget.149  
Such a state, Professor Balkin argues, “grows naturally out of the Wel-
fare State and the National Security State; it is their logical succes-
sor.”150  The welfare state requires information in order to build insti-
tutions to govern domestic affairs, while the national security state 
acquires information and creates military and other institutions in 
furtherance of national security and power.  The greater the quantity 
 
146 333 U.S. 10, 16 (1948) (“An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of 
his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis in law for 
the intrusion.  Any other rule would undermine ‘the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and would obliterate one of the most funda-
mental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, 
and the police-state where they are the law.”). 
147 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965)). 
148 Id. at 90–91.  See generally Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 303 (2010); Daniel J. Salove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 112 (2007).  
149 See Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2008) (describing the “National Surveillance State,” as one in which “the govern-
ment uses surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems, to 
head off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services”). 
150 Id. at 5. 
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and quality of information, the better the welfare and national securi-
ty states can function.  Balkin’s national security state seems to merge 
police powers with the “police state” into a normalized system of gov-
ernance aimed at both social and national security. 
An older mode of governance, the “police power,” focused on the 
security of everyday internal practices, including commerce, achieved 
through the civil administration of laws designed to augment the wel-
fare of the people.151  As Bernard Harcourt demonstrates, administra-
tion of public economy and “police” were conceptually indistinct dur-
ing the late eighteenth century.152  By contrast to this concept of 
“police,” the Oxford English Dictionary provides its earliest example 
of the English term “police state” from 1851,153 a concept not availa-
ble until the emergence of modern urban police forces.154  When the 
dystopian example of the “police state” emerged in Supreme Court 
opinions in the mid-twentieth century, it was distinct from both ordi-
nary police power and from the accepted role that modern police 
forces played in the maintenance of civil order.  What Balkin fore-
tells, and the Supreme Court at times warned against, is the merging 
of policing powers with security priorities into something that might 
look like the dystopian “police state,” albeit as the “national surveil-
lance state” it may no longer be thought dystopian.  In this way, what 
limits the practice of dystopian constitutional analysis are the atti-
tudes we adopt and the salience of examples we have in mind, each 
of which can change with time and political circumstance.  Nonethe-
 
151 Michel Foucault traces the history of the development of “police” as a form of what he 
calls “governmentality.”  He explains:  “Police is the set of interventions and means that 
ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the consti-
tution and development of the state’s forces.”  MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, 
POPULATION:  LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1977–78, 421 (Michel Senellart, ed., 
Graham Burchell, trans. 2007).  He continues:  “It is this connection between strengthen-
ing and increasing the powers of the state, making good use of the forces of the state, and 
procuring the happiness of its subjects, that is specific to police.”  Id. at 421–22. 
152 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:  PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF 
NATURAL ORDER 18–21 (2011). 
153 Dictionaries cannot settle the question of meaning when meaning is, in part, the very is-
sue.  Nonetheless, the Oxford English Dictionary provides an instructive summary of a 
common way of understanding “police state”:  “A totalitarian state run by means of a na-
tional police force, using repressive methods such as covert surveillance and arbitrary ar-
rest and imprisonment to control the population.”  Police State Definition, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/146832 (from Oxford 
English Dictionary, 3d. Ed. 2006) (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
154 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial:  A View from the 
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 (1983).  See also Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban 
Police, 15 CRIME & JUSTICE 547, 553 (1992) (asserting that “[u]niformed police spread 
across the United States to most cities in the three decades between 1850 and 1880”). 
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less, dystopian analysis remains an established method of constitu-
tional analysis, requiring decision makers to consider the implications 
of constitutional rules for whatever kind of “national state” they 
might create. 
Seeing dystopian constitutional analysis in practice leaves open 
the question of the value it provides to American constitutionalism.  
Because fears and aspirations are subject to change, because choice 
in the scope of doctrinal analysis alters outcomes, and because consti-
tutional practice cannot avoid theory, as the next section explores, 
dystopian analysis has a significant role to play in American constitu-
tionalism. 
III.  WHY DYSTOPIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
Dystopian constitutionalism is not a comprehensive constitutional 
theory.  Comprehensive theory requires greater agreement on goals 
and values than does dystopian constitutionalism.  Judge Harvie Wil-
kinson is troubled by the tendency for judges to engage in what he 
calls “cosmic constitutionalism,” the attempt to explain all of consti-
tutional law through a theory that has the effect of empowering the 
judiciary.155  On his view, cosmic constitutionalism is more akin to 
utopian constitutionalism in that it purports to shed light on the ide-
als towards which we should strive.  By contrast, dystopian constitu-
tionalism is far more modest.  It purports to keep in view states of 
government we wish to avoid or practices that might introduce a slide 
towards an undesirable state.  Dystopian constitutionalism, as we have 
seen, also has a positive aspect.  To know what we wish to avoid re-
quires us to say something about the values that make our desired 
forms of government distinctive.156  In this way, avoiding the negative 
consequence requires us to consider the values we wish to preserve.  
Values such as privacy or dignity or democratic deliberation can re-
main general, requiring no utopian expression.  A chief virtue of dys-
topian analysis is its modesty—both negative and positive. 
Dystopian analysis, as we have seen, also invites holistic constitu-
tional analysis.  A decision maker must look beyond the particular de-
 
155 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 3 (2012) (positing that 
“[m]odern constitutional law has fallen victim to cosmic constitutional theory.  Over the 
last fifty years, we have witnessed the rise of theories that purport to unlock the mysteries 
of our founding document”). 
156 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 77 (1988) (“One cannot begin to engage 
in constitutional interpretation without having in mind a model of the point of the entire 
constitutional enterprise.  That point of the American Constitution . . . must be to 
achieve a political order worthy of respect . . . .”). 
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tails of a doctrinal domain to consider the systemic and structural ef-
fects that follow from adopting one rule or another.  As this Part ex-
plores, case outcomes can differ in part by whether more holistic or 
particularistic perspectives are adopted.  Whether to view costs or po-
lice practice in one way, or to allow technology to introduce new po-
licing practices, depends in part on the salience of negative exem-
plars.  Moreover, how we understand the negative examples is itself a 
matter of debate.  When it comes to criminal procedure, for example, 
deference to police practices will never be without limits, nor will lim-
its to police practices ever go without some deference.  Instead, the 
nature of a possible, or real, dystopian state of affairs—like the nature 
of policing practices themselves—depends on historically and socially 
situated technological capacities, perceived needs, and political cli-
mates, among other factors.  Which form of analysis—deference or 
dystopian—takes priority depends on what risks legal decision makers 
view as most salient.157  These risk perceptions are manifest in differ-
ent argument forms as the next Part examines. 
A.  How One Justice’s Modus Tollens Can Be Another Justice’s Modus 
Ponens 
Shifting constitutional meanings central to the continued salience 
of dystopian constitutional analysis are on display in the reasoning of 
the Roberts Court in Kentucky v. King.158  Recall that one of the para-
digm cases employing a “police state” comparison is the Court’s opin-
ion in Johnson v. United States, establishing Fourth Amendment pro-
tections against warrantless home searches.159  Affirming the 
importance of the home, Justice Jackson admonished:  “The right of 
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not 
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in rea-
sonable security and freedom from surveillance.”160  For the Roberts 
Court, neither “reasonable security” nor “freedom from surveillance” 
are reasons to reject such police practices under reasoning devoid of 
dystopian considerations, for in Kentucky v. King the Court affirmed a 
“right” of officers to “thrust themselves into a home” without a war-
rant, rejecting the central rationale of the prior framework.161  That 
 
157 See generally Thomas P. Crocker, Order, Technology, and the Constitutional Meanings of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685 (2013). 
158 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
159 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
160 Id. at 14. 
161 Id. 
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prior framework Johnson established had insisted that “[w]hen the 
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a 
rule, to be decided by a judicial offer, not by a policeman.”162  At issue 
in King was whether the police were justified in entering a home 
without a warrant after smelling burning narcotics at the door where 
they had knocked, mistakenly believing a suspect had recently en-
tered the apartment.163  The claimed justification was the exigent fear 
of evidence being destroyed.  The officers’ knock at the door, howev-
er, produced this possibility and their fear.  Justice Samuel Alito’s 
opinion reasoned:  “[A] rule that precludes the police from making a 
warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever 
their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the 
reach of this well-established exception to the warrant require-
ment.”164  Exigency creates an exception to the requirement that a ju-
dicial officer determine when the right to privacy must yield to the 
discretionary need of law enforcement.  In this way, the dystopian 
analysis—that such police practice would produce a police state—
recedes in the face of the priority of the exception over the rule.  The 
Court’s analysis focused only upon the needs of police.  In fact, priva-
cy enters the analysis only through a passing attempt at reassurance 
that the Court’s rule “provides ample protection for the privacy rights 
that the Amendment protects.”165 
Justice Jackson’s opinion provided a consequence avoidance ar-
gument in the form of a modus tollens.  If the Constitution allows po-
lice to enter homes without a warrant based on their own discretion-
ary judgments of need, then we would live in a police state.  In order 
to avoid the dystopian consequence of living in a police state then we 
must not allow police to enter homes based on their own discretion-
ary judgments.  Philosophers have a saying that helps us link the 
opinions in Johnson and King:  One philosopher’s modus ponens is an-
other philosopher’s modus tollens.166  What marks the difference be-
tween the two argument forms is whether one affirms the antecedent 
or denies the consequent.  Justice Jackson denies the consequent in 
denying that our Constitution allows us to live in a police state.  If this 
 
162 Id. 
163 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854. 
164 Id. at 1857. 
165 Id. at 1862.  The opinion seems ambivalent about the “privacy right that the Amendment 
protects,” which could entail very little protection indeed.  Id. 
166 See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, WORDS AND LIFE 280 (James Conant ed., 1994) (illustrating the 
well-known maxim that one philosopher’s modus ponens is another philosopher’s modus 
tollens). 
Dec. 2015] DYSTOPIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 637 
 
denial is correct then it follows that the antecedent must also be false: 
the police should not have the discretion to enter a home without a 
warrant.  But by contrast, Justice Alito’s opinion in King affirms the 
antecedent in affirming that the exception should be its own rule 
that allows police to enter a home at their own discretion when they 
can claim an exigency.167  But a real difficulty arises from the condi-
tional statement that Justice Jackson’s opinion creates.  If police can 
enter at their own discretion, as Justice Alito’s opinion affirms, then it 
would follow that the Constitution is no barrier to living in a police 
state.  Justice Jackson’s modus tollens becomes Justice Alito’s modus po-
nens. 
If the “police state” was once defined in relation to the evils cases 
such as Johnson sought to avoid, contemporary affirmation of those 
evils must also be affirmation of the basic features of the police state, 
at least, that is, if that definition still holds.  But of course, to affirm 
these “evils” is not to affirm of them as evil, since under the Court’s 
majority analysis these practices are now seen as goods.  Meanings are 
subject to change, even inversion, over time.  By constructing consti-
tutional meaning to provide “ample protection for the privacy 
rights”168 of individuals subject to such intrusions, the Supreme Court 
authorized practices once thought constitutive of a police state, creat-
ing new assumptions about the relationship between governing pow-
er and personal liberty.  It may be that yesterday’s dystopian police 
state can become tomorrow’s normal state of governance.  For the 
home to yield to the pressures of discretionary police practice—given 
the home’s special place in Fourth Amendment doctrine—something 
has changed analytically from Johnson to King, not merely in how the 
majority decided the facts before it, but through how the opinion 
construes the constitutional meaning of governing practices it con-
fronts.  One of the key features in this transformation is the absence 
of dystopian constitutional analysis. 
Through citation to Johnson, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s lone 
dissent in King makes the dystopian contrast.169  Giving analytic priori-
 
167 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857. 
168 Id. at 1862. 
169 Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing “our form of government, where of-
ficers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law”) (citing Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948)).  At the time King was decided, the most recent ma-
jority opinion using “police state” occurred in Justice Brennan’s 1987 opinion in Houston 
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462–63 (1987).  After 1987, three more cases, including King, make 
reference to the police state.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 774–75 (2000) (Kennedy, 
J. dissenting) (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462–63 (1987)); United States v. 
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ty to the needs of police practices produces different constitutional 
meanings than granting priority to the privacy of individuals.170  The 
emergence of judicial attitudes towards police practice that Justice 
Jackson claimed indicative of a police state is therefore visible in the 
priorities articulated in Fourth Amendment doctrine.171  If the Court 
asks “[h]ow ‘secure’ do our homes remain if police, armed with no 
warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on hearing sounds indica-
tive of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of un-
lawful activity”172 it has in view a very different constitutional meaning 
for the forms of governance in which police discretion plays an im-
portant role than if it focuses on constructing how “warrantless 
searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable.”173  
A Supreme Court determined to curtail the discretionary power of 
law enforcement, like a Court determined to curtail executive power 
itself, will create different constitutional meanings and structures that 
constrain governing practices, in part informed by consequence 
avoidance arguments and negative exemplars.174  In pursuit of these 
differences, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kentucky v. King repre-
sents a mature articulation of the basic elements of constitutional 
analysis and vision devoid of dystopian considerations.  In this opin-
ion, the holistic considerations about the nature of governance, the 
 
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 725 n.7 (1990) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 755 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
170 See Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, supra note 148, at 326 (positing that “[i]t is not 
enough to say that we have a right to ―reasonable police practices, because questions of 
reasonableness presuppose answers to questions concerning the analytic priority of priva-
cy and police practice.  These prior questions require articulation of comparative consti-
tutional values involving privacy, liberty, and social good”); see also David Alan Sklansky, 
Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1702 (2005) (stating that “the goal is to 
strike the right balance between letting the police do their job and preserving our demo-
cratic liberties”). 
171 On the one hand, the Court has explained that “[t]he purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one’s per-
son, house, papers, or effects.  The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental in-
vasion of these areas of an individual’s life.”  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 
(1974).  On the other hand, “Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the 
exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activi-
ties.”  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-
Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”:  The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. 
REV. 127, 141 (1974)).  In regulating police conduct, the Court is mindful that its rule 
not “impede[] effective law enforcement.”  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 
(1991). 
172 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1865 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 1858. 
174 Compare, for example, discussions of executive power in BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE 
AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010), with those offered by POSNER & VERMEULE, 
supra note 39.  
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effects on privacy and liberty, and the comparative meanings of con-
stitutional practice are missing in favor of a narrow focus on doctrinal 
considerations of the relation between an exception and a rule and 
the claimed needs for police discretion.175 
To convert one Justice’s modus tollens into another’s modus ponens 
requires affirming antecedent conditions rather than denying conse-
quences.  Dystopian analysis provides salient examples of conse-
quences to be avoided, asking us to question the antecedents we 
might be tempted to affirm.  In this way, negative exemplars—
totalitarian governments or the concept of a police state—can be 
thought to function as availability heuristics that make particular ex-
amples salient in our thought.176  If the examples provide insufficient 
resonance, then no defining heuristic will resonate, making affirma-
tion of policing practices more likely.  To choose one argument form 
over the other makes a difference in constitutional analysis and out-
comes.  In King, Justice Alito engaged in a particularistic doctrinal 
analysis focused only on the specific details of the case at hand, con-
cluding that a contrary ruling would “unreasonably shrink the reach 
of this well-established exception.”177  By contrast, Justice Jackson 
conducted a holistic inquiry, mindful of the structural and systemic 
effects on governing practices from the rule of police procedure that 
the Court adopts.  This contrast between the presence and absence of 
dystopian analysis determines doctrinal outcomes, shapes policing 
practice, and reflects differing visions of American constitutionalism 
B.  Particularism and Holism in Legal Analysis 
Dystopian analysis takes into consideration the potential holistic 
implications of not only the doctrinal rules themselves, but also the 
political world they reflect and impart.  When Justice Douglas dissents 
in United States v. White against the possibility of pervasive surveillance, 
as we have seen, he contests not only the doctrinal rule in which indi-
viduals assume the risk of government eavesdropping in all of their 
interpersonal interactions, but also the political world such a rule 
makes possible.178  Justice White, writing for the majority, focused in-
stead on the fact of public exposure and the risks that entail without 
 
175 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858–62. 
176 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman 
et al. eds., 1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005). 
177 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857. 
178 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762–63 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Monitor-
ing, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.”). 
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concern for broader implications for police practice and political 
life.179  This contrast between analytic approaches to constitutional 
cases—divided between particularistic and holistic considerations—is 
central to an explanation of dystopian constitutionalism’s unique 
contribution.  One cannot reason from avoidance of dystopian con-
sequences, or construct the slippery slope, without consideration of 
the more holistic implications of doctrinal development.  Dystopian 
analysis excludes narrow particularism.180 
The choice of approach can be outcome determinative, as two 
approaches to constitutional analysis of GPS tracking illustrate.  Un-
der a sequential approach, each action a police officer takes is isolat-
ed and analyzed synchronically in a step-by-step fashion to determine 
at each step whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred.  
Seeking “to analyze whether government action constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure, courts take a snapshot of the act and 
assess it in isolation.”181  This approach is set in contrast to an analysis 
of the aggregate effects of police surveillance that taken sequentially 
might yield different conclusions.182  So, for example, the question 
when it comes to deciding whether police may temporarily stop a 
person and engage in a limited search, a stop and frisk, is not what 
the systemic effects of adopting such a practice might be, but whether 
a “particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security”183 
has occurred.  Personal security is considered in the isolated mo-
ment, devoid of further considerations of the nature of that personal 
security, even as the Court might consider a balance of interests be-
tween individual privacy and government need.184  And in determin-
ing whether personal security has been invaded under particularism, 
 
179 Id. at 752–53 (holding that there is not a constitutional difference between infiltrating a 
criminal organization electronically or through covert agent). 
180 By taking a more holistic approach, dystopian constitutionalism asks questions of fit and 
justification of a rule within a wider system of constitutional practice in a way similar to 
Ronald Dworkin’s argument for herculean legal analysis.  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
181 Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012). 
182 See generally David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass:  The Pitfalls and 
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381 (2013); 
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society:  A 
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2012) 
(discussing ways to codify the Court’s decision in Jones). 
183 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
184 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“Whether a search is reasonable 
‘is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an in-
dividual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion 
of legitimate governmental interests.’”). 
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courts assess each action in a step-by-step fashion.  Was the act of 
stopping to speak to a person a seizure?  Was a limited pat down of 
outer clothing a search?  If so, what standard governs that act?  Or, 
under the third-party doctrine, courts ask whether police access to in-
formation disclosed to a third party for limited purposes would con-
stitute a search, without considering the systemic effects of such a 
practice.185  And under the public observation doctrine, courts ask 
whether a person’s movements were observable from a public vantage 
point, without regard to the scope, scale, or implications of pervasive 
public surveillance.186  These inquiries focus on discrete and isolated 
police actions taken at a particular time.  More holistic views of ac-
tions over time or in combination are invisible to the particularistic 
approach.187 
Holistic analysis, by contrast, considers the quantity, in addition to 
the nature, of police actions.188  As Danielle Citron and David Gray 
argue, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy in more than particu-
laristic terms, by contemplating the quantity of police activities in the 
aggregate as having constitutional significance.189  Such a view gained 
the sympathy of five Justices in Jones. 190  Even if line-drawing exercises 
 
185 E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”). 
186 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (noting that there is a limited 
expectation of privacy in a car because it is not typically a primary residence and there-
fore surveillance techniques are acceptable). 
187 In a dissent from denial of en banc review from the D.C. Circuit opinion in Jones, Judge 
David Sentelle reasoned that “[t]he sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also 
zero.”  United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle J., dissenting).  
One problem with this formulation is with the assertion that actions taken in the aggre-
gate have no constitutional value because individually they have none.  Such a claim 
would run afoul of the compositional fallacy in asserting that the composition of a group 
of activities has the same traits as the individual constitutive parts (e.g., a wall and the in-
dividual bricks that comprise it). 
188 Judge Alex Kozinski, writing in dissent from denial of re-hearing en banc of the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion that GPS monitoring did not violate the Fourth Amendment, reasoned 
that “[t]here is something creepy and un-American about such clandestine and under-
handed behavior.  To those of us who have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an 
eerie feeling of déjà vu.”  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2010) (dissenting from denial of re-hearing en banc). 
189 See Danielle Citron & David Gray, Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 144 (2013) 
(arguing surveillance actions should be viewed in their totality when examining their 
compatibility with the Fourth Amendment). 
190 In United States v. Jones, Justice Alito, joined by three others, concurred, reasoning that the 
quantity of surveillance violated an expectation of privacy.  132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Writing a separate concurrence to join Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion, which relied on the existence of a physical trespass, Justice Sotomayor expressed 
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might be difficult when deciding what quanta of surveillance alters 
the nature of the police action, the Court nonetheless recognizes the 
holistic effects of GPS monitoring.  Reflecting this concern over the 
quantitative attributes of GPS monitoring, Justice Sotomayor “would 
ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government 
to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, 
sexual habits, and so on.”191  And as we have seen, Justice Sotomayor 
connects these quantitative concerns to matters of democratic gov-
ernance.192 
A sequential approach that neither looks at the aggregate effect of 
a police activity directed at a single individual such as Antoine Jones 
nor at the systemic effect of a practice upon the social and political 
life of the polity, would seem to rely on a claim that each action taken 
sequentially has no effect upon the next.  Iterative police activities, 
like investigations taken as a whole, are not random, discrete physical 
events in the universe (like a fair coin toss).  Unlike the random ac-
tions that generate the Gambler’s Fallacy,193 each action taken in a po-
lice investigation is not independent of the next.  Rather, they are 
aggregative, interpretive, interpersonal, and political.  They are ag-
gregative in that the sum of police actions can have a qualitative and 
quantitative difference from the episodic event.  They are interpreta-
tive because they depend on discretion and judgment requiring both 
momentary and later analysis of meaning and reasonableness.  They 
are interpersonal because police actions occur within a background 
of personal and social relations.  And they are political because police 
practices construct a political world that relates citizens to governing 
practices and executive discretion. 
The quantity of information, and some hint at the systemic effects 
of allowing police searches, are matters the Court considers in Riley v. 
California in applying the search incident to arrest doctrine to smart 
 
her sympathy for the view that the quantity of surveillance was of Fourth Amendment 
concern as well.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
191 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
192 Id. 
193 The Gambler’s Fallacy occurs when a person mistakenly believes that short-term patterns 
of random events (like a fair coin toss) alter the underlying randomness of events such 
that the next iteration after a string of heads is more likely to be tails.  The fallcy occurs in 
thinking that the probabilities of each event have some connection to the prior and sub-
sequent events.  See, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124–31 (Sept. 27, 1974).  
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phones.194  Holding that the nature of the smart phone is insufficient-
ly similar to the kinds of physical objects subject to search upon arrest 
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that both 
quantitative and qualitative privacy issues are involved.195  The opin-
ion recognizes that too unlimited a freedom to search bespeaks the 
founding worry over “general warrants”—an analysis that uses a nega-
tive exemplar.196  In this way, limitations on searches of cell phones 
are tied to foundational concerns over unchecked government power 
to engage in general searches.  This concern has implications for the 
proper role of government in our constitutional system.  Because a 
search of a cell phone incident to arrest reveals too many of the “pri-
vacies of life,” it reveals too great a quantity of information to grant 
discretion to individual police officers to conduct a search.197  The 
Court reasoned that searches of cell phones are “quite different,”198 
and thus do not require automatic application of existing doctrine to 
a new technology.  The Court went out of its way, however, to explain 
that exigency exceptions still apply that would enable police to search 
a phone’s contents in an appropriate circumstance.199  The opinion 
considers the privacy implications only after surveying the two princi-
pal justifications for the search incident doctrine—officer safety and 
preserving evidence.200  It is only because these justifications fail in the 
case of cell phones that the opinion then turns to the quantitative 
dimensions of privacy.  The quantity of information itself creates a 
qualitative difference in the meaning and implications of the practice 
 
194 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (discussing the unique nature of modern 
cell phones due to their immense storage capacity). 
195 Id. at 2491 (“A [cell] phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records pre-
viously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never 
found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”). 
196 Id. at 2494 (“Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was the founding 
generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the co-
lonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained 
search for evidence of criminal activity.  Opposition to such searches was in fact one of 
the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.”). 
197 Id. at 2495. 
198 Id. at 2490 (noting that the quantity of information on a cell phone makes it very differ-
ent from any other potential personal item seized during an arrest). 
199 Id. at 2484–85. 
200 Linda Greenhouse’s assessment of the opinion’s rationale is that it is highly personal be-
cause it recognizes that the Justices might be just as vulnerable as the rest of us to viola-
tions of cell phone privacy.  See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Justices Have Cell 
Phones Too, NY TIMES, June 26, 2014, at A27 (“‘[E]mpathy,’ the ability to put oneself in 
someone else’s shoes, [is] so often missing from the Supreme Court’s criminal law deci-
sions but perhaps on display here.  But on reflection, it’s not really empathy.  The justices 
are walking in their own shoes.  The ringing cellphone could be theirs—or ours.”). 
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federal and state officials sought to regularize.  Riley is therefore a ho-
listic opinion in that it ties its rational to the negative exemplar of 
revolution-causing government abuse, but particularistic in that it 
gets to such questions only because narrower doctrinal approaches 
fail to suffice. 
A tendency for constitutional law to take a particularistic doctri-
nal, rather than a holistic, approach to constitutional questions is en-
abled by the absence of dystopian analysis.  The Founders, according 
to the Court in Riley, had reason to fear general warrants.  In this way, 
the Riley Court employed a founding-era negative exemplar used in a 
form of early dystopian analysis.  But the Court does not explain why 
modern Americans might fear government practice having access to 
the quantity of data available on cell phones.  Having in view such 
broader considerations for ourselves, rather than citing to our fore-
bears’ revolutionary concerns, allows consideration of values apart 
from policing needs for “easily administrable rules.”  The absence of 
contemporary negative exemplars yields no further explanation of 
why the quantity of data is too much—that is, how general warrants 
might be a feature of present-day form of undesirable governance. 
One might think a too generalized arrest power would be as prob-
lematic as a general search power, but an emphasis on more particu-
larized doctrine produces a different result.  Prioritizing easily admin-
istrable rules, for example, in examining whether a custodial arrest of 
a young mother who committed a minor, non-jailable, offense com-
plied with the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista looked only to whether the officer had probable 
cause to believe that an offense had been committed.201  The Court 
recognized that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratui-
tous humiliations imposed by a police officer” upon Ms. Atwater.202  
Nonetheless, holistic questions about such discretionary power in the 
hands of the individual police officer, combined with the violation of 
dignitary interests of the person arrested, played no part in the 
Court’s analysis.203  By contrast, the four-Justice dissent in Atwater 
viewed the dignitary harm of being arrested and jailed for “gratui-
 
201 Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, 
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). 
202 Id. at 346. 
203 The Court even acknowledged that the arrest imposed a “pointless indignity” upon the 
young woman.  Id. at 347.  See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, 
and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1002 (2014) 
(“[T]he Atwater Court refused even to ask whether an objectively reasonable officer would 
have acted likewise.”). 
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tous” reasons more than sufficient to undermine the reasonableness, 
and hence the constitutionality, of the officer’s conduct.204  In so do-
ing, the dissent took a more holistic perspective, warning that “[t]he 
per se rule that the Court creates has potentially serious consequenc-
es for the everyday lives of Americans.”205  Moreover, “[s]uch un-
bounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse.”206  
Choice of perspective can be outcome determinative. 
Arrests are accompanied by searches, and the systemic implemen-
tation of arrest, and searches incident, can have effects that are invis-
ible to particularistic approaches.207  When DNA testing as a techno-
logically advanced means of identifying individuals became available 
to police, the Court concluded that “the intrusion of a cheek swab to 
obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one,”208 outweighed by “significant 
state interests in identifying [an arrestee] not only so that the proper 
name can be attached to his charges but also so that the criminal jus-
tice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial custo-
dy.”209  In deciding in Maryland v. King that police searches using DNA 
testing to identify arrestees in custody are reasonable, the Court add-
ed one more implication for the individual subject to arrest.210  The 
reasoning is based on the “critical role”211 DNA identification plays in 
furthering law enforcement interests in accurate identifications com-
bined with the claimed limited privacy interest invaded. Since ar-
restees are subject to searches of their person and identification 
through fingerprints, the Court reasoned in King that the added 
benefit of greater accuracy and quantity of information available 
through DNA is an “important advance” that outweighs any further 
incidental intrusion on privacy.212  Moreover, the Court recognized a 
tradition of allowing law enforcement to utilize “scientific advance-
ments in their standard procedures.”213  As a version of “special 
needs” jurisprudence, and as a doctrinal extension of the loss of pri-
vacy experienced through arrest, the Court looks no further than 
 
204 See id. at 362–63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the behavior that the majority 
found to be “merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer”). 
205 Id. at 371. 
206 Id. at 372. 
207 As the Atwater dissent observes:  “A custodial arrest exacts an obvious toll on an individu-
al’s liberty and privacy, even when the period of custody is relatively brief.”  Id. at 364. 
208 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013). 
209 Id. at 1980. 
210 Id. at 1963. 
211 Id. at 1963. 
212 Id. at 1964. 
213 Id. at 1975. 
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what it sees as the incidental additional burden DNA swabbing im-
poses.  In adopting this particularistic approach, the majority focuses 
primarily on the needs of police in isolation from the broader social 
and political contexts in which such an exercise of government power 
is situated.214 
Writing in dissent, by contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia offers a neg-
ative exemplar with a new name—“a genetic panopticon.”215  This 
new form of “panopticon,” as Justice Scalia notes, will provide gov-
ernment officials with a database of citizens’ DNA to aid in various 
identifications—for school, travel, solving crimes, and more.216  For 
one thing, the majority’s attempt to limit its holding to identification 
of those arrested for “serious offenses” does not relate to the reasons 
proffered for the government’s interest in identification.  
“[R]eluctant to circumscribe the authority of the police”217 to engage 
in such searches, the Court accepted the government’s claim to have 
a special need to ensure proper identification of criminal arrestees.  
But the Transportation Safety Administration also has an important 
interest in determining that airline travelers are properly identified, 
as Justice Scalia observes, so why not allow DNA swabs for air passen-
gers?  Moreover, why limit law enforcement to “serious offenses”?  As 
Justice Scalia asserts, “logic will out”218 with the predictable future 
consequence that “your DNA can be taken and entered into a na-
tional DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and 
for whatever reason.”219  Justice Scalia, as does the Riley majority, 
evokes the similarity to eighteenth century British practices of issuing 
“general warrants”—practices that motivated revolutionary fervor 
against the tyranny the Fourth Amendment proscribes.220 
A panopticon allows officials to exercise state power from a cen-
tral location that renders visible a targeted population without the 
source of surveillance itself being open to view.  Designed as prison 
architecture by Jeremy Bentham,221 the basic power structure can oc-
cur in other contexts—including the “genetic panopticon” Justice 
 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 1974. 
218 Id. at 1989. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1980. 
221 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Verso 1995) (1787); see also 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 207–08 (Aland Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
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Scalia identifies.222  Forms of panoptic state power can be used to reg-
ulate the quotidian aspects of everyday life alongside conduct 
deemed criminal.  Exercising such panoptic power is not in itself in-
dicative of a dystopian state, but is perhaps a necessary condition for 
the possibility of such a state, and power that is not clearly necessary 
for forms of democratic governance.  Without the dystopian analysis a 
conception of the “genetic panopticon” provides—that is, the idea 
that panoptic structures can go too far—the majority in King lacks an 
important analytic tool for examining the reasonableness of its doc-
trinal conclusion that DNA swabs are no different in kind or degree 
from other information the state obtains from arrestees. 
The measure of doctrines employing Fourth Amendment re-
quirements of reasonableness can only be taken through a social im-
aginary of the practices at stake.223  We cannot have an adequate un-
derstanding of where our decisions are located in political space if we 
do not occasionally remind ourselves of what it is we seek to avoid, 
even if we struggle to agree on that to which we aspire.  Particularism 
does not allow us a vantage point from which we can measure the dis-
tance we have traveled towards or away from undesirable governing 
states.  Focused only upon the narrow doctrinal question, particular-
ism fails to see the bigger picture of the repeated and systemic prac-
tice and the potential effects it will have on democratic governance 
and constitutional practice.224  Nor does particularism ring true to a 
tradition of constitutional discourse originating from the founding 
period, and enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, of cast-
ing Americans’ constitutive legal commitments in opposition to those 
states of tyranny they seek to avoid.  Holistic reasoning through the 
grammar of consequence avoidance makes salient questions of na-
tional identity and commitment often otherwise absent from consti-
tutional discourse. 
 
222 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
223 CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 25 (2004) (“[The social imaginary] is in 
fact that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, with-
in which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense that they have.”). 
224 As Justice Jackson observed: 
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and 
then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence . . . I 
am convinced that there are[] many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles 
of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is 
made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.  
  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  See also Har-
ris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“To sanction 
conduct such as this case reveals is to encourage police intrusions upon privacy . . . it is 
important to remember that police conduct is not often subjected to judicial scrutiny.”). 
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C.  Dystopian Constitutional Theory 
Holistic analysis of the structure of government set against unde-
sirable exercises of governing power has a long tradition in American 
constitutionalism.  From the founding period the Declaration of In-
dependence warned that “[t]he history of the present King of Great 
Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in 
direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these 
States.”225  Advocating the structural advantages of federalism, Alex-
ander Hamilton argued that the institutional division of power com-
pliments the strength of the people, where they will be “more compe-
tent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a 
tyranny.”226  Combining structural concerns with a practical political 
warning about the danger of faction in his Farewell Address, George 
Washington admonished that, “[t]he disorders and miseries which 
result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose 
in the absolute power of an individual.”227  These considerations from 
the early Republic bespeak a reliance on a method of dystopian con-
stitutional analysis seeking to avoid states of governance against which 
early Americans defined themselves. 
Despite this tradition we find present both at the Founding and 
through Supreme Court opinions in the post World War II era, Pro-
fessors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that this tradition 
constitutes a “tyrannaphobia” that either “produces no benefits . . . or 
it produces minimal benefits and substantial costs.”228  Rather than 
being a source for analytic contrasts and consequence avoidance ar-
guments, they find that a set of “irrational beliefs” and “the emotion 
of fear” distorts decision making.229  They define tyrannaphobia, how-
ever, more narrowly, covering a subset of dystopian analytic cases that 
might be said to equate a “legally unconstrained executive with one 
that is unconstrained tout court.  The horror of dictatorship that re-
sults from this fallacy and that animates liberal legalism is what we call 
‘tyrannophobia.’”230  If what they call “tyrannaphobia” does no analyt-
ic and causal work in preventing harmful executive excess, then what 
checks executive discretion?  On their view, demographics provide 
 
225 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
226 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 180 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
227 GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in 35 WRITINGS OF 
WASHINGTON 214, 227 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
228 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC 204 (2010). 
229 Id. at 179. 
230 Id. at 176. 
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the best check.  They reason that “[t]he modern economy, whose 
complexity creates the demand for administrative governance, also 
creates wealth, leisure, education, and broad political information, all 
of which strengthen democracy and make a collapse into authoritari-
an rule nearly impossible.”231  Tyranny is avoided by political and eco-
nomic checks, not by law or legal institutions. 
Dystopian constitutionalism is about more than avoiding authori-
tarian dictatorial regimes, but about avoiding states of governance 
that put us on a path to such rule or to states of affairs that have simi-
lar liberty diminution outcomes.  Liberal constitutionalists want to 
avoid other governing forms and practices more indicative of a “po-
lice state” that do not constitute arbitrary rule by an individual or 
small group.  In this way, even if the argument about “tyrannaphopia” 
were correct, it would be far too narrow to count as an objection to 
dystopian constitutionalism.232  But second, there is good reason to 
doubt that demographics alone provide the bulwark against undesir-
able governing states such as dictatorships.  Liberal legal constitu-
tionalism depends upon a set of beliefs, commitments, and attitudes 
that in part constitute a normative order within which our political 
practices occur.233  Without legal principles and reasoning, our politi-
cal practices would lack the structure necessary for ordering debate 
and constraining expectations.  That the “United States is too 
wealthy, with a population that is too highly educated, to slide into 
authoritarianism,”234 is a factual condition that itself is the product of 
liberal legal principles and institutions designed to curb arbitrary ex-
ercises of authority.  Shared commitments to constitutional principles 
and constraints structure political possibilities.  Moreover, shared 
sensibilities about what constitutes states of governance to be avoided, 
such as the tyranny of arbitrary rule, are part of the American consti-
tutional reasoning.  That the novel 1984, for example, could serve as 
 
231 Id. at 201. 
232 See Crocker, supra note 125, at 1539–43. 
233 See, e.g., Post, supra note 35, at 76 (“Constitutional law draws inspiration, strength, and 
legitimacy from constitutional culture, which endows constitutional law with orientation 
and purpose.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change:  The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1342 (2006) 
(“[P]opular confidence that the Constitution is the People’s is sustained by understand-
ings and practices that draw citizenry into engagement with questions of constitutional 
meaning and enable communication between engaged citizens and officials charged with 
enforcing the Constitution.”); id. at 1327 (“[C]onstitutional culture supplies understand-
ings of role and practices of argument through which citizens and officials can propose 
new ways of enacting the society’s defining commitments—as well as resources to resist 
those proposals.”). 
234 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 39, at 193. 
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a common point of reference in oral arguments in United States v. 
Jones illustrates how dystopian analysis helps structure legal and polit-
ical reasoning.235  Orwellian discourse provides this structure by in-
forming a social imaginary in which particular political outcomes be-
come infeasible. 
No doubt, consequence avoidance arguments rely in part on fear 
that present decisions will produce, or put us on a path towards, the 
undesirable governing state.  What Judith Shklar calls the “liberalism 
of fear” requires “the possibility of making the evil of cruelty and fear 
the basic norm of its political practices and prescriptions.”236  The lib-
eralism of fear does not aspire to utopian states, but it also does not 
rely on the contingent historical circumstances of wealth and politics 
without the backing of constitutional forms and rights limitations.  
Like the liberalism of fear, dystopian constitutional analysis seeks to 
avoid those conditions of systemic fear or cruelty that would lead a 
citizenry to take refuge in the most immediate solutions to necessities 
irrespective of otherwise operable legal commitments.  But fear does 
not stand alone as a reason to adopt policies one way or another.  Ra-
ther, fear motivates further justificatory arguments about whether a 
rule or outcome best coheres with constitutional principles, and in so 
doing, examines what best avoids a slide towards an undesirable state 
of governance.  When employed in judicial reasoning, far from mani-
festing phobia, dystopian reasoning plays a role in both checking ex-
cess through constitutional principles and in keeping systemic conse-
quences salient for our constitutional analysis. 
As we have seen it in operation, dystopian analysis does not re-
quire decision makers to agree on ideal states of governance, or upon 
a unique conception of what the constitution means.  In this respect, 
dystopian constitutionalism is modest and ideologically neutral.  It 
does not tell us what states of governance to avoid.  It asks us to keep 
in mind that only through self-conscious attention to the boundaries 
of our constitutional principles and practices can we be sure to avoid 
the slippery slopes that might lead to undesirable institutional prac-
tices.  To avoid negative consequences, decision makers have to look 
more holistically beyond the narrow confines of a doctrinal domain 
to see how a potential rule or rule application fits into broader insti-
tutional practices.  In so doing, however, the fit need not be one that 
 
235 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-
1259). 
236 Shklar, supra note 34, at 30. 
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necessarily coheres with outcomes generated by adhering to grand 
visions of constitutional theory.237 
Dystopian constitutionalism is contingently related to the forms of 
government we happen to fear most at any given time.  We do not 
have to divine what the Founders feared, for fear depends on the de-
velopment of technology and forms of political life.  Totalitarian re-
gimes were unimaginable to the Founders, though other forms of 
tyranny were.238  It does not require agreement on ideal states, but 
something more like an overlapping consensus that particular prac-
tices appear too constitutive of the undesirable state of governance 
for the polity to adopt as their own.239  Shifts in the analysis of war-
rantless home entries reflected in the differences between earlier cas-
es like United States v. Johnson that warned of a looming police state to 
those like Kentucky v. King that prioritize the needs of law enforce-
ment may be a product of changes in risk assessments and toleration 
of practices that may have once seemed constitutive of states to be 
avoided.240  Although obtaining overlapping consensus on the unde-
sirable states is meant to be easier than doing so for the ideal, it is by 
no means assured.  But the conversation the dystopian analysis invites 
is one that considers the structural and systemic effects of the rule if 
adopted.  Without this more searching analysis, we cannot make ex-
plicit what forms of government the polity finds undesirable and 
which it might seek to avoid through choice of constitutional rules 
and principles. 
Dystopian constitutionalism provides a common analytic gram-
mar.  Consensus on ideal states may prove difficult to obtain, but a 
tradition of comparative analysis provides a shared set of references.  
Thus, in oral arguments in United States v. Jones, as we have seen, Jus-
tices could make reference to 1984, and even specific aspects of the 
novel such as the existence of the Ministry of Peace, in shaping their 
inquiry into the systemic effects of adopting one or another rule in 
 
237 I borrow the term “grand visions” from the article title by H. Jefferson Powell, Grand Vi-
sions in an Age of Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2067 (2006). 
238 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (Madison).  The Writs of Assistance case focused atten-
tion on the abuses of general warrants, the significance of which is reflected in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (“‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and 
there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Brit-
ain.  Then and there the child Independence was born.’”). 
239 I adopt the idea of an overlapping consensus from JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(1971) and from JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 385–95 (1996). 
240 See supra notes 158–176 and accompanying text. 
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the case.241  No one needed to spell out the plot, or explain the refer-
ence because it already had the common grammatical role within 
constitutional discourse.  Dystopian avoidance provides a way of talk-
ing about common aversions and aspirations.  If there is a tendency 
in one direction that produces bad outcomes, then to avoid them is 
to aspire to different, presumptively good outcomes, even if we need 
further analytic terms to describe these better outcomes.242  Beyond 
shared grammar, however, constitutionalism in practice depends up-
on constitutionalism in theory.  And dystopian analysis need not be 
wedded to any particular theory of constitutional interpretation, even 
as it does invite decision makers to seek rules that best fit and cohere 
with an American tradition of describing and avoiding undesirable 
governing states.243 
Dystopian constitutionalism is more modest than living constitu-
tionalism.244  In the sense that the states of government we may fear 
are subject to change, it has affinities with living constitutionalism.  
But to the extent that constitutional meanings require more substan-
tive articulations of what, for example, free speech requires, dystopi-
an analysis is only ever part of the interpretive process.  It asks us to 
articulate the positive values that separate our understanding from 
the undesirable state, but it does not compel any particular content 
or means of generating that content.  Though, like the living consti-
tutionalism advocated by Bruce Ackerman, it does require analysis of 
the actual constitutive commitments Americans have made through 
the institutions they have built and the laws they have passed.245  In 
this way, our commitments can be manifest against changing circum-
 
241 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 34, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 
10-1259). 
242 In this way, as Mark Graber emphasizes, “[w]hat constitutes good or legitimate constitu-
tional politics depends on the best answers to questions about what citizens hope to ac-
complish by constitution writing and constitutional government.”  MARK A. GRABER, A 
NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (2013). 
243 In this way, dystopian constitutionalism shares a method with legal empire building of the 
kind Dworkin envisioned.  See generally DWORKIN, supra note 180; Ronald Dworkin, The 
Moral Reading of the Constitution, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 21, 1996), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/03/21/the-moral-reading-of-the-constitution/ 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
244 See Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 30, at 1754 (“The aim of interpretation is 
to understand the constitutional commitments that have actually been made by the 
American people in history, not the commitments that one or another philosopher 
thinks they should have made.”).  See also STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 33–49 (defending 
common law constitutionalism as a form of living constitutionalism). 
245 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 1754. 
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stances in which new consequences to be avoided become salient 
while others fade away. 
More robust than minimalism, dystopian constitutionalism disa-
vows the necessity of deciding cases in both narrow and shallow 
ways.246  A conception of judicial minimalism asks judges to decide 
cases on narrow grounds and with shallow analysis, leaving much un-
decided for future cases and legal development.247  Minimalism may 
be an appropriate way at times to decide difficult cases, but it is un-
clear how a decision maker can say ex ante that decisions should take 
a particular scope and form.248  Dystopian analysis requires considera-
tion of holistic structural questions in the attempt to avoid undesira-
ble consequences, but it is not methodologically committed to the 
particular substantive form a decision must take.  It is, however, 
committed to a method of reasoning when appropriate.  Systemic is-
sues might prove unavailing, but in cases in which consequence 
avoidance arguments become salient, dystopian constitutionalism re-
quires decision makers to confront them.  In this way, dystopian con-
stitutionalism overlaps in appropriate cases with minimalism, but de-
parts in those cases in which a wider frame of analysis compels a 
wider rule to avoid the effects of a negative exemplar. 
If constitutional theorists were to take an original approach to 
originalism by examining the tradition of dystopian analysis that ex-
tends from the founding era, embedded in the texts of the Declara-
tion of Independence and the popular case for adopting the Consti-
tution of 1789 found in The Federalist, then dystopian 
constitutionalism is an original and constitutive feature of constitu-
tional analysis.249  So in this sense, it is consistent with originalism.  
But it is both more modest and more robust than originalism as a 
practice of doctrinal interpretation.  It is more modest in that it does 
not require adherence to such a rigid methodology as discerning 
what the original meanings might be of, at times, aspirational and 
 
246 See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 48. 
247 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 10–11. 
248 In this way, judges should provide “reasoned elaboration of how the relevant legal analy-
sis produces the particular outcome,” in a way that fits the needs of case.  DANIEL A. 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:  PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43 (2009).  Sometimes, that reasoned elaboration makes dystopian 
analysis both relevant and required. 
249 See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985) (challenging the validity of original intent through an examination of 
cultural traditions in legal interpretation). 
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open-ended clauses.250  It is more robust because in relevant cases, it 
requires decision makers to consider more than original meaning by 
inquiring about the possible states of governance we presently most 
seek to avoid.  These states, as we have seen, are subject to change as 
new forms and fears develop.  The original grammar of American 
constitutionalism has this dystopian element, leaving to future gener-
ations the task of providing the substantive content for their aversions 
and their aspirations. 
Living and original constitutionalism, as well as theories of judicial 
minimalism, do not account for the rich array of approaches to con-
stitutional theory.  Dystopian constitutionalism is partial constitution-
al theory.  It is partial in that it is incomplete by design.  It does not 
purport to provide a comprehensive theory of constitutional inter-
pretation.  It is an analytic supplement that plays an important role in 
broadening constitutional analysis by considering the systemic and 
structural effects of the rules courts adopt.  But is also partial in that it 
is biased against forms of governance that lead to systemic depriva-
tion of liberty and undermining of democratic processes—the consti-
tutive elements of an alternative constitutive national identity against 
which the American polity identifies itself.  As method, it is about 
keeping in mind negative boundaries, and providing a grammar for 
talking about how to construct rules that steer us away from negative 
consequences.  As substance, it is about affirming a national agree-
ment on core values and commitments that comprise a constitutional 
identity.  And where agreement proves elusive, dystopian constitu-
tionalism reminds us why keeping faith in the constitutional conver-
sation is vital to the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Dystopian constitutionalism can never be the sole approach to 
constitutional analysis.  We the People cannot govern only in the 
mode of consequence avoidance.  But constitutional practice has 
multiple aspirations and many aversions.  At the same time, constitu-
tional analysis would be deficient without some negative exemplars to 
warn against practices that might lead to unwanted consequences.  
Unlike utopian constitutionalism, however, a polity need not reach 
agreement on common conceptions of the good or the ideal of a per-
fect society.  Dystopian constitutionalism requires the easier contrast 
 
250 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 849, 856–57 
(1989) (discussing the complexity involved when attempting to “plumb the original un-
derstanding of an ancient text”). 
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rather than the more difficult aspiration.  We may disagree over the 
good, but find it easier to attain agreement on the bad consequences 
we wish to avoid.  Dystopian constitutionalism uses this asymmetry to 
make possible holistic thinking about principles and values without 
presupposing utopian agreement.  Disagreement can persist over the 
best rendering of due process values, for example, or Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, for dystopian constitutionalism asks on-
ly that we maintain critical awareness of the negative consequences 
on which we do agree.  But this critical awareness has a positive value, 
supplementing other modes of constitutional argument that focus on 
doctrine, precedent, history, and purpose.  For we may find it diffi-
cult to see how a present constitutional question when considered in 
doctrinal isolation furthers or inhibits broader constitutional values.  
Dystopian analysis supplements other constitutional arguments to fa-
cilitate analysis of the more comprehensive constitutional fidelity and 
fit we might expect from a proposed decision.  We may find it diffi-
cult to measure how close we come to realizing the ideals of the 
“more perfect Union” our Constitution seeks to achieve without 
keeping in view how distant we remain from the dystopian states we 
seek to avoid. 
 
 
